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THE ARKANSAS MARITAL PROPERTY STATUTE AND THE
ARKANSAS APPELLATE COURTS: TIPTOEING TOGETHER
THROUGH THE TULIPS
Ora Fred Harris, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Displaying an immense discernment of the trying nature of divorce
litigation, one commentator astutely made this observation:
The dissolution of a marriage is always a difficult time at best. Per-
haps the closest relationship known to man is in the process of being
torn apart. Many times the parties are hurt and bitter. Quite often
young children are involved. Divorce litigation is almost always a dis-
tasteful and painful experience.'
Generally, one of the most troublesome and indeed significant de-
terminations made by courts during the course of the emotionally
charged divorce process is dividing the property accumulated by the
parties during the marriage. Through the years, courts have utilized a
variety of approaches to accomplish this task.' Some of the methods for
distribution of property have been excoriated as being unfair and ineq-
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Professor of Law, Cincinnati College of Law.
1. Note, Property, Maintenance and Child Support Decrees Under the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REV. 559 (1973).
2. Note, Divorce and the Division of Marital Property in Arkansas-Equal or Equitable?, 35
ARK. L. REV. 671, 675-76 (1982).
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uitable,3 while others have been extolled.
Similarly, Arkansas' property division laws have enjoyed mixed re-
views over the years; the most recent development in this regard is the
legislative adoption of the concept of "marital property. '' 5 Since its en-
actment in 1979, the Arkansas marital property statute has been the
subject of a relatively sizable amount of litigation, 6 some of which has
provided much-needed illumination. But some unanswered questions
have been spawned as well." And many thorny issues have not been
addressed squarely by either the Arkansas Supreme Court or the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals.8
It is the purpose of this article to closely examine the concept of
marital property in the context of the Arkansas marital property stat-
ute, to synthesize and analyze the interpretative decisions of the Arkan-
sas appellate courts concerning the marital property statute, and to fo-
cus upon and provide some insight regarding those questions under the
marital property law which remain unanswered. In the course of theo-
rizing about the unresolved and unaddressed aspects of Arkansas mari-
tal property law, guidance will be drawn occasionally from the exper-
iences of several sister states that have similarly entered the realm of
either presumptive equal or equitable distribution of marital property.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
One can reasonably conclude that both presumptive equal and eq-
uitable division of marital property statutes have stemmed from a per-
vasive discontent with common law-based property division statutes.0
The principal flaw in common law concepts governing distribution of
property upon divorce is that judicial inquiry generally focuses upon
the situs of title to the marital assets to the exclusion of any considera-
tion of the relative contributions of the marital partners to the acquisi-
3. See e.g., Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the
Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C.L REV. 761, 788 (1982) (the separate property approach
and the equitable distribution system).
4. Id. at 788 (the system of fixed rules).
5. 1979 Ark. Acts 705 (subsequently amended by 1981 Ark. Acts 69, 714, 798, and 799 and
1983 Ark. Acts 369).
6. See, e.g., Forrest v. Forrest, 279 Ark. 115, 649 S.W.2d 173 (1983); Hackett v. Hackett,
278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982); and Belanger v. Belanger, 276 Ark. 522, 637 S.W.2d 557
(1982).
7. For a discussion of these judicially spawned unanswered questions, see notes infra 394-
477.
8. A discussion of the difficult, unaddressed questions appears at infra notes 275-393.
9. Krauskopf A Theory For 'Just' Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV.
165, 167 (1976).
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tion of the respective properties. 10 The inequitable results of the com-
mon law system are no more painfully evident than when a "shrewd"
partner (more frequently the husband) astutely places title to property
acquired during the marriage in his name, excluding his homemaker
wife.1" Under the common law system, in view of its relentless search
for "title," the property is considered to be separate property of the
husband unless the court can impose a constructive trust upon the
property or otherwise trace equitable title.1 2
The palpable defect in the common law system is that it fails to
regard marriage as a joint undertaking or partnership.13 Consequently,
the system inevitably breeds unfairness and inequity."' Against this
background, a number of individuals have strongly advocated the adop-
tion of more equitable modes of dividing property incident to divorce. 15
10. Note, Treating Professional Goodwill As Marital Property In Equitable Distribution
States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 556 (1983). Only "[five states - Florida, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia - continue to abide by the common law division of property
upon divorce with title usually controlling." Id. at 557, n. 21. See also Comment, The Marital
Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution?, 50 U. CHt. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1983) ("Under the
traditional common law system . . .. property follows title.") But there does seem to be some
recent defections from the group of states subscribing to the common law-based "title" theory of
property division. For instance, Virginia appears to have entered the realm of equitable distribu-
tion via Va. Code § 20-107.3 (1983). Moreover, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and West
Virginia may have done so by way of judicial decision. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.
2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300 (Miss. 1982); Burgess v. Burgess, 227
S.C. 283, 286 S.E. 2d 142 (1982); and LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E. 2d 312 (W. Va. 1983). See also
Case Comment, LaRue v. LaRue: Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets Finally Available in
West Virginia, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1983). These cases "utilize the concept of 'special equity
doctrine' which recognizes a spouse's right to equitable considerations where the spouse has made
significant contributions, whether as the result of rendering services as a homemaker or otherwise,
to the acquisition of property during marriage." Hemingway and Daniel, Legislative and Judicial
Developments Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, THE ARMy LAW-
YER 1, 8-9 (January 1984). Query: Are the commentators correct in concluding that "there is
arguably no state which continues to follow the 'title' scheme of distribution of material assets"?
Id. at 7.
11. Foster and Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8
FAM. L. Q. 169, 174 (1974).
12. Foster and Freed, Marital Property and the Chancellor's Foot, 10 FAM. L. Q. 55, 73
(1976).
13. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 167. If one goes back to the earliest days of marital property
law in England, it is obvious that the common law has made great strides since then notwithstand-
ing its present shortcomings. As one commentator has observed about the feudal English marital
laws: "[m]arriage converted the wife into a legal cipher, or a nonperson." Johnston, Sex and
Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1972).
14. Foster and Freed, supra note 11, at 175.
15. See e.g., Johnston, supra note 13, at 1057, where the commentator acknowledges the
harshness of the common law system. And because of its draconian character, outstanding com-
mentators like Krauskopf, Foster, and Freed have advocated its demise. See supra notes 11-13.
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One of the most noteworthy efforts in this regard was undertaken by
the commissioners who drafted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(hereinafter UMDA). 1 6 Discussing the commissioners' intent with re-
gard to the UMDA, one writer has aptly noted that "they did want to
incorporate the shared enterprise or partnership theory of marriage
•. * *as a major guiding principle in dividing property at divorce."'"
Hence, they sought a major break from the common law method of
distributing property.18
In a similar vein, there was also a ground swell of dissatisfaction
with the concept of "fault" which frequently permeates the property
division issue under common law statutes.' 9 Thus, property divisions,
based partially upon the misconduct of the marital partners, take on an
aura of retribution against the "misbehaving" spouse and a semblance
of reward for the "injured" spouse,20 despite the inexactitude associ-
ated with singling out and assigning blame in a domestic relations dis-
pute.2 1 Hence, fault-conscious property division statutes tend to ignore
a salient objective of a property division: to equitably divide the marital
property between the parties.2
The UMDA 2  is significant primarily because it incorporates the
shared enterprise or partnership theory of marriage into the distribu-
tion of property which is a "product" of the marriage .2  Moreover, as a
See also Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 223, 235 (1939).
16. Note, supra note 3, at 761.
17. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 166. The commissioners' ideas were not novel, however. A
number of states wanted to infuse more equity into property distribution. Id. at 172. See also
Comment, supra note 10, at 1092. ("The majority of states...have modified the commonlaw
title-based system so as to allow courts to apportion all the property of the divorcing parties.")
18. The equitable distribution of marital property concept promulgated by the commissioners
bears some similarity with the community property system. Namely, the partnership theory is
fostered by both and hence, the veritable marital expectations of the parties are more likely to be
vindicated. Daggett, supra note 15, at 234-35.
19. See e.g., Newbern and Johnson, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Analysis for
Arkansas, 28 ARK. L. REv. 175, 183-84 (1974), where the commentators criticize the utilization
of the concept of fault in our divorce laws, specifically alluding to its prominence in the prior
Arkansas property division statute. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962) (amended 1981 and
1983).
20. Id. at 198.
21. Id. at 198, (removal of the fault concept should ameliorate the disharmony associated
with property division).
22. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELAIONS § 14.8 (1968).
23. UMDA § 307 (1970), 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979).
24. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 173. ("[Tihe court's power to divide property was not ex-
tended to all property (including separate property) owned by the spouses because the shared
enterprise or partnership theory is inherently applicable only to property acquired during the mar-
riage through the efforts of the spouses.")
[Vol. 7:1
ARKANSAS MARITAL PROPERTY
corollary, it eliminates marital fault or culpability as a factor in the
property division question. The net effect presumably is that property
distributions incident to divorce will be more amicable and equitable .2
More significantly, under the UMDA, a woman is placed on a higher
plane, "capable of owning property and contributing her individual
capital to the partnership, '27 whether it is through the nonmonetary
contributions of a homemaker or the monetary donations of a bread-
winner. Both are of equal importance under the UMDA."
This important departure from the common law by the UMDA
signalled to the various common law states that a credible mechanism
was indeed available to satisfy their cravings "for more equitable divi-
sion of family assets."" Moreover, the dubious constitutionality of
some of the common law-based property statutes in view of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Orr v. Orrs° was an additional impetus for
some states to reform their laws with respect to property division inci-
dent to divorce. 1
The equitable distribution model established by the UMDA has
been the polestar for many states who initially subscribed to common
law rules."' It calls for "marital property" to be equitably divided be-
tween the partners of the marriage on the basis of several equitable
criteria, specifically excluding marital fault.'3 Note that the UMDA
permits "only the division of 'marital property'. ' " The rationale for
this limitation is simply that only property which is truly a "product"
of the marriage should be subjected to the partnership theory. Stated
differently, only that property which is actually a part of the marriage
25. Note, supra note 1, at 560.
26. Newbern and Johnson, supra note 19, at 198.
27. Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: What Does the Court Deem 'Just
and Right?' 19 Hous. L. REV. 503, 504 (1982). Actually, the commentator was alluding to the
Texas system of marital property which has its genesis in the "Spanish gananical system." The
comparison is appropriate because its principle underpinning is the theory of "equality or partner-
ship" between the spouses which underlies the UMDA and is at variance with the common law.
28. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2 at 688-89.
29. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 172.
30. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
31. Note, supra note 2, at 677, ("[Bly implication, the Court held other gender-based stat-
utes unacceptable.")
32. New York, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and Maine are examples of states which have
adopted the concept of equitable distribution of marital property.
33. Actually, these equitable standards are to be applied by the court only in the specific
instance when the parties are unable to arrive at property settlement or when an agreement is
reached but is later found by the court to be unconscionable and hence totally unacceptable.
O'Connell, Marriage, Divorce, and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 17 N.Y.L.F. 983,
1015 (1972).
34. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 173.
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partnership "pie" should be distributed in a manner akin to the dissolu-
tion of a business partnership. 5
Some disagree as to whether the concept of equitable distribution
of marital property better promotes the partnership theory of marriage.
In fact, one commentator has assailed the equitable distribution ap-
proach to property division as being too costly, cumbersome, and non-
productive, while placing his imprimatur upon a system grounded upon
the fixed rule of a presumption of an equal division. 6 It is not known
whether the commissioners seriously considered the presumptive equal
division of marital property approach; it is fairly clear, however, that
they found automatic equal distribution to be unpalatable.37 To date,
only three states seem to have embraced the presumption of equal dis-
tribution concept.38 Even in these states, an equitable distribution is
made on the basis of criteria strikingly similar to those enumerated in
the UMDA when an equal distribution is deemed to be inequitable. 9
Whether the distribution is characterized as equitable or equal,
the policy underpinnings for eschewing the common law approach are
present. That is, marriage is viewed as a partnership in which the con-
tributions of each spouse, whether monetary or not, should be consid-
ered.' 0 Moreover, the property disposition should be designed to make
each party financially independent without punishing either.' 1 These
cornerstones of both the presumptive equal and equitable distribution
of marital property statutes clearly distinguish them from their com-
mon-law-based counterparts and, in turn, make them more appealing
to the states.' Those states adopting either the system of presumptive
equal or equitable distribution of marital property are simply adhering
to this clarion call: "At a minimum, a state retaining the common-law
35. See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV. 1, 9-10
(1981); Note, supra note 2, at 689; Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 173.
36. Note, supra note 3, at 788.
37. It has been noted that "[t]he Commissioners deemed the most socially important consid-
eration the economic dependency or self-sufficiency of the spouses. An automatic equal division of
property would ignore that factor entirely." Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 175.
38. Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983)), Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. §
767.255 (West 1981)), and North Carolina, (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1983)) have
adopted the presumptive equal distribution of marital property system. Under this system, the
marital property is divided equally unless said division would be inequitable. If so, then the court
effectuates an equitable division in light of the enumerated equitable criteria.
39. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1983).
40. Note, supra note 2, at 689.
41. Id. at 676.
42. Approximately "forty common-law states" have adopted either presumptive equal or eq-
uitable distribution of marital property statutes. Freed and Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 14 FAM. L. Q. 229, 250 (1981).
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system should grant equitable discretion to divorce courts to distribute
and divide property, however title is held, as equity and justice
require."4
III. COMPARATIVE STUDY
The need to find an appropriate method for dividing the property
of a marriage at divorce is perhaps more important today than at any
other time in history in view of the current pervasiveness of divorce."
Yet, a totally palatable solution still seems to elude almost everyone
involved with the problem.' 8 To date, states are roughly divided along
the lines of either the community property system, the separate com-
mon-law property system, equitable distribution, or the fixed rules
system."6
The community property system has been commended as repre-
senting "the soundest and most equitable base of all systems."1' 7 Per-
haps the most appealing feature of the community property theory is
its perception of marital assets as an economic partnership. 48 Conse-
quently, in a community property state, the community assets are com-
monly divided equally between the parties,' 9 thereby producing some
degree of certainty and equity in the divorce settlement.5 0 This salient
feature has evoked this comment: "The true community or partnership
idea of the assets of the spouses accumulated by their joint efforts
seems a practical and simple method of giving each a sense of security,
reward, accomplishment, and justice."51
But the idea of marriage as a partnership or joint enterprise not
only underlies the community property system, it is likewise, as previ-
ously noted, an underpinning of equitable, and necessarily equal, distri-
bution of marital property as well.5 2
43. Foster and Freed, supra note 12, at 59.
44. Note, supra note 3, at 761.
45. Id. at 761.
46. Id. at 788.
47. Daggett, supra note 15, at 230.
48. Id. at 234-35.
49. Foster and Freed, supra note 11, at 170. But in some community property states, an
equitable distribution of the community assets is authorized. See Freed and Foster, supra note 42,
at 249. (In Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Puerto Rico, Texas, and Washington, "there is an equitable
distribution.")
50. Daggett, supra note 15, at 230-31. The commentator perceives the element of certainty
arising from a rule of equal division as a significant feature of the community property model
which is worthy of emulation. Id. at 230-31.
51. Id. at 234-35.
52. Note, supra note 3, at 761-71.
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With a growing number of common-law states now moving to the
realm of either presumptive equal or equitable distribution of marital
property, there has developed a corresponding sensitivity among the
courts to enhance the status "of the propertyless housewife" and to
"give recognition to the notion of marriage as a partnership."5  A com-
parative study of these jurisdictions reveals some interesting similarities
and distinctions. For example, a significant number of formerly com-
mon-law distribution states now consider a spouse's contributions as a
homemaker in the acquisition of the marital assets to arrive at an ap-
propriate property distribution." Moreover, many of these states have
marital property statutes which specifically list a number of equitable
criteria for the courts to consider in fashioning an equitable distribution
of the marital property. 5 And although there is some divergence of
opinion, there seems to be movement in the direction where states are
no longer considering the marital misconduct of the parties in connec-
tion with the property distribution determination." It is evident that
these actions are consistent with a growing "concern for more equitable
division of family assets. 57
III. THE ARKANSAS MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION
STATUTE
A. Historical Background
In Arkansas, interest in a fairer and more equitable division of the
property accumulated during the marriage at divorce mushroomed to a
high level in the case of McNew v. McNew.58 In McNew, Associate
Justice Hickman, in a dissenting opinion, raised the conscience level of
the populace when he stated: "Parties marry, share their love, lives,
fortune and misfortunes. In divorce they should share equally the
53. Id. at 769.
54. Freed and Foster, supra note 42, at 246. The commentators list a total of 28 states,
including Arkansas, which elevate the homemaker's status.
55. Id. at 247. The commentators enumerate 31 states as having adopted some specific crite-
ria which are balanced to make the property division.
56. Id. at 247-48. Views concerning the utility of marital fault in the context of property
division are as diverse as (1) excluded, expressly or implicitly (Arkansas), (2) permitted as a
discretionary factor, and (3) considered in regard to "economic misconduct" in the sense of squan-
dering the marital assets, etc. Id. at 248.
Of course, in those states that subscribe to the community property method of distribution,
variation in treatment likewise exists in regard to the consideration of marital fault---some say
"yes" and some say "no". Id. at 249.
57. Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 172.
58. 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977).
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property they have accumulated during their marriage. Anything less
is obviously unfair. 59
Justice Hickman's comment was actually part of a broad, scathing
indictment of the then Arkansas property division statute 0 because of
its inherent tendency to spawn unfairness, inequity, and disharmony
between the spouses of the marriage."1
To fully appreciate Justice Hickman's insightful criticism, one
must understand the exact nature of the property division system which
was embodied in the former statute. Of great importance in this regard
is the fact that fault and gender were the two principal underpinnings
of the statute.62 Fault was a significant factor, for if the wife were
awarded the divorce because she was the injured party, then the court
was required to award her one-third of the husband's personal property
absolutely and one-third of his realty for life.63 And the statute was
gender-based to the extent that it contained no reciprocal provision for
an injured husband to take of his wife's property." Commenting upon
the absurdity of these deficiencies under the facts of McNew, Justice
Hickman stated: "The chancellor could not have awarded the husband
any of the wife's property, according to Arkansas law, and had to
award the wife property simply because she was granted the divorce.
Therein lies the obvious inequity and discrimination. '"65
Some have theorized that this patent gender-based disparity in
treatment in regard to property division by the predecessor statute had
its genesis in the "traditional common-law view of the husband's duty
to support."" But this common-law-based disparate treatment has un-
dergone some exacting scrutiny and questioning in view of current soci-
59. 262 Ark. at 574, 559 S.W.2d at 159 (emphasis added). The majority opinion did not
critically examine the propriety of the statute in view of its finding that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a divorce because of inadequate corroboration.
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962) (amended 1981 and 1983).
61. The statute's appropriateness had been questioned earlier by commentators. See. e.g.,
Newbern and Johnson, supra note 19, at 198, and Mobley, The Arkansas Divorce-Do We Have
Problems?, 23 ARK. L. REv. 601, 618 (1970).
62. Newbern and Johnson, supra note 19, at 183-84. Although the old general property stat-
ute mandated that the division of property be predicated upon fault and gender, tenancy by the
entirety property was subject to equal division under ARK. STAT. ANN. 34-1215 (Supp. 1983). See
Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813, 815 (1981).
63. Curiously, if both the husband and wife were at fault, then the court had the liberty to
appropriately reduce the wife's statutory award. See Narisi v. Narisi, 233 Ark. 525, 345 S.W.2d
620 (1961) and Alexander v. Alexander, 227 Ark. 938, 302 S.W.2d 781 (1957).
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962) (amended 1981 and 1983).
65. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. at 573, 599 S.W.2d at 159.
66. Note, Constitutionality of Arkansas Property Settlement and Alimony Statutes. McNew
v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977), 2 UALR L.J. 123, 131-32 (1979).
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etal conditions. 67
For instance, in Orr v. Orr,"8 the United States Supreme Court
expressed its dissatisfaction with a gender-based alimony statute which
contained a provision for awarding alimony to the wife but had no re-
ciprocal provision authorizing an award to the husband. The Court
spurned Alabama's alimony statute as it was written and insisted that
Alabama act in a gender-neutral fashion by either abolishing alimony
completely or making it available equally to both men and women.6 "
Although Orr was limited specifically to the question of gender-based
alimony statutes, it can be read broadly to cast a shadow of doubt over
the constitutionality of all gender-based statutes, including those regu-
lating property division incident to divorce."'
Here again, much earlier in McNew, Justice Hickman had already
concluded unequivocally that the predecessor Arkansas property divi-
sion statute was constitutionally infirm7 1 and had exhorted the Arkan-
sas legislature to take necessary remedial action to rectify the
situation.72
Later, the Arkansas General Assembly, clearly heeding Justice
Hickman's charge, enacted Act 705 of 1979. Its avowed purpose was to
eliminate all the apparent constitutional imperfections which plagued
the predecessor legislation.7 s
67. Mobley, supra note 61, at 618. ("[do we need to revise our present laws as to . . .
property division in view of the emancipation of women, the wage and hour law, federal and state
income taxes and social security taxes?").
68. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
69. Note, supra note 2, at 677.
70. Id.
71. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. at 573, 559 S.W.2d at 159. ("The Arkansas law regarding
property was enacted before the turn of the century and can no longer be defended historically or
legally with any confidence. It clearly violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Arkansas and
U.S. Constitutions...") (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 574, 559 S.W.2d at 159. Justice Hickman expressed his views forthrightly by de-
claring that "[i]t would certainly be best if the legislature reviewed and revamped these laws so
that they would not only meet constitutional tests but also be more suitable in assisting people to
resolve their domestic disputes."
73. 1979 Ark. Acts 705. In its pertinent part, section 7 of the Act states:
It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in a dissenting opinion
in the recent case of McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 576 (1977), regarding Ark. Stat.
Ann. Section 34-1214, a justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court said that 'The Arkan-
sas law regarding property was enacted before the turn of the century and can no
longer be defended historically or legally with any confidence' and that 'it clearly vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Arkansas and United States Constitutions';
that in the majority opinion in that same case the Court did not decide this issue,
stating 'We will not decide constitutional issues unless their determination is essential
to the disposition of the case', and holding that this issue of property division at the
time of a divorce action was not properly before it; that a decision holding that Ark.
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B. Act 705 of 1979: A Clear Expression of Legislative Reform
The Arkansas legislature took one giant leap toward divorce re-
form when it enacted a new marital property statute for Arkansas in
1979 .74 Gone hopefully are the days of rank inequity and disparate
treatment with respect to property distribution at divorce; Act 705's
underlying thesis "is that 'marital property' belongs to the parties
jointly. ' 75 In fact, the statute adopts essentially the partnership theory
of marriage.76 This is graphically illustrated by the fact that the appar-
ent "starting point" of the statute is to equally divide the marital prop-
erty."7 More precisely, the Act seems to create a statutory presumption
that there should be an equal division of the marital property unless
such a division would be inequitable.78 In that event, the court is then
authorized to make an equitable distribution of the marital property in
view of the equitable criteria enumerated in the Act. 9 Initially, the
stated criteria were: "(1) the length of the marriage; (2) age, health
and station in life of the parties; (3) occupation of the parties; (4)
amount and sources of income; (5) vocational skills; (6) employability;
(7) estate, liabilities and needs of each party and opportunity of each
for further acquisition of capital assets and income; (8) contribution of
each party in acquisition, preservation or appreciation of marital prop-
Ann. Section 34-1214 is unconstitutional would create chaos in all divorce actions then
pending in Arkansas courts until such time as the Arkansas General Assembly could
enact legislation to cover this subject; and that this Act is designed to correct and clar-
ify the law on this subject ....
The motivations underlying the legislative enactment of Act 705 have been recognized subse-
quently by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813,
815 (1981) ("The reasons for the amendment of § 34-1214 (Repl. 1962) by Act 705 of 1979 are
obvious. Public caveats on the infirmities of the old statute were given.") and by commentators as
well. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 681.
74. 1979 Ark. Acts 705 (Now codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983), as
subsequently amended.
75. Note, supra note 2, at 688.
76. Id. at 689.
77. See Krauskopf, supra note 9, at 177, where Professor Krauskopf theorizes that an equal
division threshold is an optimum method for augmenting the value and importance of the partner-
ship theory.
78. 1979 Ark. Acts 705. Act 705's net effect has been aptly described by two commentators
as follows: "In Arkansas, marital property is divided equally unless the court determines this
inequitable, in which event the courts resort to equitable distribution under criteria specified in the
statute." Freed and Foster, supra note 42, at 251.
79. 1979 Ark. Acts 705. One commentator has speculated that a departure from an equal
division is countenanced only in the instance of "demonstrable special circumstances." Note,
supra note 2, at 689. This supports clearly tie view expressed several years ago that an equitable
distribution is not always an equal one. See Daggett, supra note 15, at 228.
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erty, including services as a homemaker." 80 The final equitable crite-
rion in the 1979 version of the marital property statute-the contribu-
tions of a homemaker, both nonmonetary and monetary-is one of the
most widely applauded features of the Arkansas law81 and several other
presumptive equal and equitable distribution of marital property stat-
utes as well.82
Under the 1979 statute, if the court made an unequal distribution
of the marital property between the parties, the reasons for this une-
qual division had to be explicated in writing by the court. 83 Failure to
comply with this requirement has surfaced as an issue in several Ar-
kansas cases," suggesting the preeminent status of an equal division of
marital property at divorce in Arkansas. But this presumption in favor
of an equal division of marital property has not escaped criticism. For
example, Professor Henry Foster perceives the presumption as provid-
ing a mechanism whereby judges can simply "cop out" by utilizing it
"to avoid the difficult weighing and balancing process the case may
deserve."'85 When one considers Professor Foster's misgivings in con-
junction with Act 705's original requirement that the equitable basis
for making an unequal division be reduced to writing by the chancellor,
it is fairly obvious that the presumption might serve as a haven from an
otherwise time-consuming, complex judicial task.'
Another prominent feature of Act 705 deals with the critical ques-
tion of defining marital property for purposes of the Act. As a general
rule, only property coming under the rubric of "marital property" is
subject to division by the court at divorce under Act 705. 87 But, in a
rather obscure provision, the statute does authorize courts, in special
circumstances, to equitably divide property that the parties owned prior
to the marriage. 88 Apart from this rather narrow exception, however,
80. 1979 Ark. Acts 705. These equitable criteria bear a strong resemblance "to those em-
ployed by other equitable distribution states." Note, supra note 2, at 681.
81. Note, supra note 2, at 689.
82. For a listing of states recognizing the contributions of a homemaker see Freed and Fos-
ter, supra note 42, at 246.
83. 1979 Ark. Acts 705.
84. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 270 Ark. 602, 605-06, 605 S.W.2d 453, 455 (1980); Davis v.
Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 183-84, 603 S.W.2d 900, 402-03 (Ark. App. 1980).
85. Foster, supra note 35, at 31-32.
86. For a discussion of the potential impact of the elimination of the "in writing" require-
ment as it relates to an unequal division of marital property, see infra notes 95-96 and accompa-
nying text.
87. This rule is basically consistent with the underlying premise of the UMDA and statutes
modeled after it. That is, only property in the "kitty" should be subject to equitable distribution.
Address by DuCanto, Annual Arkansas Federal Tax Institute (Nov. 1981).
88. The "special circumstances" which must be demonstrated are the equitable distribution
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only "marital property," defined as follows, is subject to the chancel-
lor's discretion: "All property acquired subsequent to the marriage ex-
cept (1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) Prop-
erty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage
or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or de-
scent; (3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separa-
tion;89 (4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and (5)
The increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage."90
However, the Arkansas General Assembly has not become com-
placent since enacting Act 705. When the legislature convened in 1981,
some refinements, although not in wholesale amounts, were made to the
statute. One amendment concerned the requirement that the court ex-
plain its basis for making an unequal division of the marital property.
As observed earlier, Act 705 established a requirement that the court
do this in writing."' However, in 1981, the legislature modified this re-
quirement; 92 the 1981 amendment simply requires that "such basis and
reasons should be recited in the order entered in said matter."93 More-
over, a ninth equitable criterion-"the federal income tax consequences
of the court's division of property"-was adopted for the court to con-
sider in making an equitable, albeit unequal, division of the marital
property.94 Finally, the General Assembly passed an amendatory provi-
criteria enumerated in the Act. Moreover, the statute exacts a requirement that the court "state in
writing its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party who owned it at the time
of the marriage." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Supp. 1983). See also Williford v. Wil-
liford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398, 401 (1983).
89. This exception to the marital property law has been subsequently amended to substitute
"divorce from bed and board" in place of "legal separation." See 1981 Ark. Acts 799.
90. 1979 Ark. Acts 705. Generally, the exception to the marital law in Arkansas embrace
property which cannot be characterized as a "product" of the marriage. A notable exception to
this generalization is exception number 4 (property excluded by valid agreement of the parties);
here again, the statute is consistent with the UMDA in allowing the parties to opt out of the
realm of marital property if they so desire, provided their agreement is fair, reasonable, and con-
scionable. See UMDA §§ 306 and 307.
91. See supra notes 83-84.
92. 1981 Ark. Acts 69. A very recent case involving the statutory requirement of a court
stating the reasons for making an unequal division of marital property is Duncan v. Duncan, II
Ark. App. 25, 665 S.W.2d 893 (1984). In this case, a chancellor, who seems to have inadvertently
departed from the equal division mandate, committed reversible error by failing to state "specific
reasons for not equally dividing the parties' marital savings." 665 S.W.2d at 895.
93. 1981 Ark. Acts 69. The exigent circumstances that prompted the legislative amendment
are graphically stated in the Act's emergency clause and reads as follows: "[t]he requirement that
such basis and reasons be stated in writing in all such cases results in unreasonable delays in such
proceedings and in inconvenience to the parties and to the courts; . . . this Act is designed to
permit the court to orally state the basis and reasons for such division of property and should be
given effect immediately."
94. 1981 Ark. Acts 798. The primary purposes of this amendment were to insure that the
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sion which deleted the "[p]roperty acquired by a spouse after a decree
of legal separation" exception to the marital property law and substi-
tuted "[p]roperty acquired by a spouse after a decree of divorce from
bed and board" as the exception."
An accurate assessment of the impact of the aforementioned
changes in view of available data is difficult, if not impossible. Perhaps
with the passage of time, definite effects, both positive and negative,
will become evident. Dispensing with the "in writing" requirement, al-
though a timesaving measure, may be improvident in that it relieves
the chancellor from having to engage in a trenchant analysis, weighing
and balancing the stated equitable criteria in the statute; this deficiency
is not remedied by mandating that the basis and reasons for the une-
qual division be "recited in the order", which is generally prepared by
an attorney of record, simply trying to reduce to writing the reasons
previously articulated orally by the chancellor. Regarding the insertion
of the federal income tax consequences factor into the realm of consid-
eration, this seems to be a significant improvement. It seems perfectly
reasonable that the effect on the value of the settlement by the federal
income tax consequences of the division should be considered.9 6 And
lastly, the substitution of "divorce from bed and board" for "legal sepa-
ration" as an exception to the marital property law seems to be consis-
tent with the current state of Arkansas law.
Following this well established pattern of fine-tuning periodically
the marital property statute to augment the probability that the court
will proceed in an equitable manner in regard to division of property,
the General Assembly in the 1983 legislative session added a provision
dealing with the distribution of marital property in the form of stocks,
bonds, or other securities. The amendment provides:
dramatic effect of the tax ramifications of divorce would be judicially considered and that the
parties would be made aware "of the potential impact of federal income taxes upon property
divisions." (Emergency Clause).
95. 1981 Ark. Acts 799. The principal rationalization for this change is outlined in the emer-
gency clause as being the nonexistence of a legal basis for a decree of legal separation in Arkan-
sas, coupled with the current understanding that a divorce from bed and board is now recognized
as a separate and distinct cause of action from absolute divorce, both of which are subject to the
provisions of the general marital property division statute. See, e.g., Forrest v. Forrest, 279 Ark.
115, 649 S.W.2d 173 (1983) and Spencer v. Spencer, 275 Ark. 112, 627 S.W.2d 550 (1982).
96. The perplexing question with regard to the federal income tax equitable criterion is what
does it mean in view of the virtual total absence of cases on this issue. In Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark.
App. 266, 273, 630 S.W.2d 53, 57 (1982), the Arkansas Court of Appeals merely tangentially
addressed the question and decided that the "contribution" toward the "acquisition, preservation
or appreciation of marital property" equitable distribution criterion justified the unequal distribu-
tion of the marital property.
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When stocks, bonds or other securities issued by a corporation, associ-
ation or government entity makes up part of the marital property, the
court shall designate in its final order or judgment the specific prop-
erty in securities to which each party is entitled, or after determining
the fair market value of the securities may order and adjudge that the
securities be distributed to one party on condition that one-half [1/21
the fair market value of the securities in money or other property be
set aside and distributed to the other party in lieu of division and
distribution of the securities.97
The apparent goal of this amendment is to clarify, facilitate, and,
in turn, foster the fair and equitable distribution of "corporate stock
and other securities in divorce proceedings." '98 Achieving these objec-
tives is undoubtedly congruent with the underlying purposes of the
seminal statute: Act 705 of 1979.
IV. SOME TROUBLESOME AREAS WITHIN THE REALM
OF MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION STATUTES
Total bliss has yet to be experienced in every facet of either pre-
sumptive equal or equitable distribution of marital property. In fact, it
has been exceedingly difficult to apply these concepts in some distinct
areas.
A. Pension Rights
Because "[flor many families, the right to receive retirement bene-
fits may constitute the principal, if not the only, substantial family as-
set," 99 it is essential that these assets be properly classified, appraised,
and allocated to insure their appropriate apportionment upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage. 10 As a practical matter, in view of the complexity
97. 1983 Ark. Acts 369. [Codified currently at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(4) (Supp.
1983)].
98. Id. (Emergency Clause).
99. Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits As Property in Illinois Divorce Pro-
ceedings, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,4 (1979).
100. Basically, the normal mode of analysis for pension benefits divisibility issues in marital
property distribution cases focuses upon these questions: (1) Are the pension or retirement rights
"property" under the local marital property statute? (2) What value does one assign to these
rights, if they are indeed capable of being characterized as "property?" and (3) How should these
valuable property rights, if this should be the determination, be distributed to the parties to the
marriage in a fair and equitable manner? Id. at 1-2.
With respect to federal governmental pension benefits payable under a federal statute which
restricts--expressly or impliedly-the alienation or assignment of the pension, the additional con-
sideration of the federal preemption of state family property law arises. Similarly, federal preemp-
tion questions concerning private pensions subject to the regulatory provisions of ERISA (Em-
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involved with pension determinations, it is often advisable that an attor-
ney who is inexperienced in the area seek the succor of "an actuary as
well as an attorney knowledgeable in the pension field." 101
Even with expert advice, however, questions concerning the treat-
ment of pension rights under state marital property laws1 2 are not gen-
erally susceptible to a facile solution. Judicial decisions vary as to
whether a pension is "property" within the meaning of the marital
property division statutes or is simply a mere expectancy. These diverse
views seems to hinge upon whether the particular pension benefit is
"vested and nonmatured", "nonvested and nonmatured", or "vested
and matured."103
Quite often, if the pension benefit has "vested", then it is charac-
terized as "property" subject to division under the relevant presumptive
equal or equitable distribution of marital property statute.' 0 In fact,
ployee Retirement Income Security Act), e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976), can arise, at least
theoretically because of the palpable restriction upon the alienation and assignment of pension
plans subject to the Act. For an in-depth discussion of these preemption issues, see infra notes
129-142.
101. Bonovich, supra note 99, at 31. As one commentator has so aptly observed: Since pen-
sion plans are individualized, the terms vary greatly. A working knowledge of the terms of the
pension plan as well as the applicable law is necessary in order to determine whether benefits are
subject to equitable distribution. Note, Pensions: After Mey v. Mey. When Are They Property
Subject to Equitable Distribution Upon Divorce in New Jersey?, 12 RUTGERS L. J. 261, 262
(1980).
A potentially negative consequence of the complexity associated with the issue of pensions as
marital property is that expert testimony may not be affordable by parties of low or "modest"
incomes. See Note, Pension Rights As Marital Property: A Flexible Approach, 48 Mo. L. REV.
245, 254 n.60 (1983).
102. The situation in community property jurisdictions is generally much more congruent.
The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington. Note, Pension Rights As Marital Property: A Flexible Approach, supra note
101, at 247 n.14, and Nevada, Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371, 1374 n.2. (1981).
There seems to be a virtual consensus among these states that pension rights are divisible as
community property upon the dissolution of the marital relationship. For some of the community
property states, this reasoning has been applies uniformly to all pension plans, both vested and
nonvested. See, e.g., Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, _ 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977) (a
property right is acquired upon the performance of the contract, irrespective of whether the pen-
sion is vested or nonvested); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, -, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976) (pension rights which arise during marriage are property
"whether or not vested.") Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919, 921 (La. 1978); Copeland v. Copeland, 91
N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978) (vested, unmature pension rights); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d
661, 666 (Tex. 1976) (nonvested pension rights are more than mere expectancies; "such rights
prior to accrual and maturity constitute a contingent interest in property and a community as-
set .. "); and In re Marriage of Jacobs, 20 Wash. App. 212, 579 P.2d 1023, 1024-25 (1978).
103. See Note, Pension Rights As Marital Property: A Flexible Approach, supra note 101,
at 248, where the various forms of pension rights which may exist during the course of employ-
ment are discussed.
104. Note, Pensions: After Mey v. Mey, When Are They Property Subject to Equitable
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this treatment has been consistently afforded to vested pension plans,
whether matured or nonmatured.'0 5 But some apparent qualifications
may exist in regard to the foregoing general principles. For instance,
some presumptive equal and equitable distribution of marital property
states have categorically refused to classify military pension benefits as
"property" subject to division. However, upon close examination, it ap-
pears that the common denominator of these decisions has been that
the military pensions were deemed not to have vested.'06 Even so, some
presumptive equal and equitable distribution states have discounted the
"vested" limitation as to divisible pension rights and have held that a
pension benefit, whether vested or not, "constitutes marital property
within the marital property statute."'01 Although this represents a dis-
tinctly minority view, 0 8 a cogent argument can be and has been made
that the accrual of benefits, not vesting, is the critical point that a prop-
erty interest comes into existence'0 9 and that the touchstone for ascer-
taining whether a pension right is marital property is "whether the [in-
terest was] 'acquired' during the marriage."" 0 Although there may be
a few maverick jurisdictions, it appears that, in the vast majority of
cases, only a vested pension benefit has qualified as divisible marital
property upon divorce.
Quite frankly, the "property vs. mere expectancy" issue may not
Distribution Upon Divorce in New Jersey?, supra note 101, at 261. The commentator notes that
marital property states generally restrict marital property subject to equitable division treatment
to those pensions that have vested.
105. See, e.g., Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Mo. 1982) (vested, nonmatured
pension rights may be considered as marital property). See also Note, Vested But Unmatured
Pensions As Marital Property: Inherent Valuation, Allocation and Distribution Problems in Eq-
uitable Distribution, 14 RUTGERS L. J. 175 n.2 (1982) for a catalog of cases subscribing to the
same views as Kuchta.
106. See, e.g., Cochran v. Cochran, 7 Ark. Ct. App. 146, 644 S.W.2d 635 (1983) (reaffirmed
the previously established principle that military retirement pay is not marital property).
107. See, e.g., Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, -, 431 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1981). See also
Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235, 238 n.3 (1978), where the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in dictum, intimated that non-vested pension rights were cognizable property
rights subject to division under the Wisconsin marital property statute; Thompson v. Thompson,
438 A.2d 839 (Conn. 1981); In Re Marriage of Laster, 643 P.2d 597 (Mont. 1982); Linson v.
Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980); In Re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa
1982); Dewan v. Dewan, 455 N.E.2d 1236 (Mass. App. 1983); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d
752 (Minn. 1983); Damiano v. Damiano, 463 N.Y.S.2d 477 (A.D. 1983) and Leighton v. Leigh-
ton, 261 N.W.2d 457 (Wisc. 1978).
108. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Camarata, 602 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1979); Walker v.
Walker, 631 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. App. 1981); Irwin v. Irwin, 406 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. App. 1980), and
Miller v. Miller, 269 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. App. 1978), where the courts have refused to recognize
that a nonvested pension is marital property.
109. Bonavich, supra note 99, at 26.
110. Id.
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be as difficult conceptually as the tasks of ascertaining the value of the
pension rights and then effectuating a fair and equitable allocation of
them between the spouses to the marriage.111 This responsibility is
grounded upon the generally accepted principle that "a trial court must
consider values in making property distributions."'
In determining the value of a pension right which comes under the
rubric of "marital property," although the employee spouse may have
no present right of access to the monetary benefits of the plan,"' courts
are assigned the extremely difficult and highly speculative responsibility
of determining, with a reasonable degree of exactness," 4 the present
value of a prospective interest which may never come into existence.
This is undoubtedly the case in regard to vested or even nonvested
plans, for that matter, which are nonmatured." 6
A variety of valuation methods have been discussed and proposed
in the cases."" One of the more penetrating analyses appears in
Bloomer v. Bloomer,"7 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed
three alternative modes of valuation and distribution: (1) The court can
award the nonemployee-spouse an "appropriate" portion of the em-
ployee-spouse's interest in the plan." 8 This simply means that in the
case of a vested, but nonmatured, contributory plan the nonemployee-
111. See, e.g., Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, -, 599 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1979) ("The more
difficult problem. . . is not deciding whether. . the marital community has a property interest in
the pension subject to division upon divorce, but in valuing and dividing that contingent interest.")
Although Shill arose in a community property context, similar problems plague presumptive equal
and equitable distribution of marital property states as well.
112. Flach v. Flach, 645 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. App. 1982). However, the Missouri Court of
Appeals placed a gloss upon the general rule by reasoning that a trial court was "not required to
specifically enumerate the values, unless requested to do so by a party." Id. at 720.
In agreement with Flach, see Dardick v. Dardick, 10 Fam. L. Rep. 1435 (1984), a decision of
the Missouri Supreme Court, where it was noted that this view was congruent "with the weight of
authority from other jurisdictions which, like Missouri, have modeled their property distribution
statutes on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act." Id. at 1436.
113. These benefits generally fall into the category of "vested, but nonmatured" pension
rights. See Note, supra note 105, at 181.
114. Greater mathematical precision is generally required in community property jurisdic-
tions that mandate an equal distribution and in marital property states which adhere to the con-
cept of a presumption of an equal distribution. See Note, supra note 101, at 252. However, in
equitable distribution of marital property states, the court's responsibility is to simply carve out a
division that is fair and equitable, and not necessarily equal. Id. at 252.
115. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis.2d at -, 267 N.W.2d at 238 ("The problem of
valuing prospective benefits under a pension plan is frequently exacerbated by the fact that unma-
tured rights may be terminated by death, discharge, or other contingencies.").
116. Id. at -, 267 N.W.2d at 238-39.
117. 84 Wis.2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). See also Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, -'
431 A.2d 1371, 1377 (1981) for a good discussion of valuation and division.
118. Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis.2d at -, 267 N.W.2d at 241.
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spouse will be entitled to a portion of the amount which the employee-
spouse has actually contributed to the plan, plus interest.119 On the
other hand, if the pension plan were noncontributory and had not ma-
tured, the employee-spouse would have no divisible interest in the plan;
(2) The court can simply award the present value of the prospective
pension benefits upon vesting.1 20 Unquestionably, this is replete with
speculation and conjecture and requires precise calculations as to the
discount factor to be used to reduce this future benefit to its present
value;2 or (3) The court can simply award the nonemployee-spouse a
fixed percentage of the future pension-whatever it may be-when it is
actually paid to the employee-spouse. 2 2 This approach is often charac-
terized as the fixed-percentage or "wait-and-see" method.' A deter-
mination of the value of pension benefits is not essential under this ar-
rangement, 124 and this may be its redeeming feature when that
determination would be too speculative. 25 Of course, difficulties associ-
ated with valuation should diminish if the pension rights have matured,
thereby conferring upon the employee-spouse an unconditional right of
immediate access to the monetary benefits. 2
Taking the allocation question one step further, a court can avoid
in some circumstances the complex task of dividing the pension rights
and yet fashion an equitable division of the marital property. "Rather
than divide prospective retirement benefits, a trial court may simply
consider pension rights as part of the marital estate and award the non-
employee-spouse an offsetting amount of other marital property."12 7
This has been considered appropriate in those cases "where the present
value of the pension rights is not too speculative and there is sufficient





123. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
639 (1976), and Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371, 1317-81 (1981). This approach
has also been referred to as the "reserved jurisdiction method." Note, supra note 105, at 189 n.87.
124. Note, supra note 105, at 193.
125. Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis.2d at - 267 N.W.2d at 241. Nevertheless, courts must
"determine the appropriate percentage to which the non-employee spouse is entitled." Id..
126. As noted in Ohm, the complexity attendant to valuing and distributing pension benefits
is more acute when dealing with "benefits to be paid in the future." 49 Md. App. at -, 431 A.2d
at 1379. See also In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 II1. App.3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979).
127. Note, Pension Rights As Marital Property: A Flexible Approach, 48 Mo. L. Rev. 245,
252 (1983). See also Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1982).
128. Note, supra note 127, at 252, citing In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 II1. App.3d 653, 663,
397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 477-78, 427 A.2d 76, 79
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Overcoming the barriers of identifying, valuating, and allocating
pension benefits does not necessarily assure victory in every factual cir-
cumstance. A potentially formidable obstacle in regard to federally-cre-
ated pension rights is the federal preemption of state family property
laws. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,2 9 the United States Supreme
Court breathed new life into the concept of federal preemption of state
family property laws.130 The Court held that a provision of the Rail-
road Retirement Act'" which proscribed the attachment of railroad
retirement benefits preempted the states from dividing these benefits
upon divorce pursuant to their marital or community property laws.""2
Although Hisquierdo's preclusion of railroad retirement benefits
from the purview of state divorce law was significant, the more para-
mount concern focused upon the decision's possible effect on a state's
power to allocate military pensions' 33 and, more recently, ERISA-regu-
lated private pensions'" upon divorce.
Regarding the military retirement benefits preemption question,
the United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty'"s addressed
it rather definitively by holding that federal laws governing the military
nondisability retirement benefits system preempted state courts from
dividing military retirement pay upon divorce pursuant to a state's
community property laws.'3 6 Later, the Court in Ridgway v. Ridg-
(1981); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 414, 575 P.2d 99, 104 (1978).
129. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
130. It was generally thought prior to Hisquierdo that family law matters were almost exclu-
sively within the domain of the states. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
131. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976).
132. The court essentially established a two-pronged test for determining whether federal
preemption applied in state family or family property cases: (1) There must be a conflict between
the state law and the expressly declared intent of Congress and (2) The state law must be likely to
cause substantial harm to the federal interest involved. Applying both elements of the test to the
facts of Hisquierdo, the Court concluded it was a classic case for federal preemption. See His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 592.
133. Some community property states-most notably California-had previously adopted the
position that military pensions were divisible under their local law. See, e.g., Milhan v. Milhan, 27
Cal.3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) and In re
Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal.3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825
(1974).
134. There is a provision of ERISA which does restrict the assignment and alienation of
pension benefits subject to the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1979).
135. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
136. The McCarty decision has been roundly criticized by some commentators for its appar-
ent disregard for the stringent preemption test enunciated in Hisquierdo. See Note, The Federal
Military Retirement System Preempts State Community Property Law at Divorce: McCarty v.
McCarty, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 463 (1982); Bierman and Hershberger, Federal Preemption
of State Family Property Law: The Marriage of McCarty and Ridgway, 14 PAC. L.J. 27, 44
(1982), and Note, Domestic Relations: Military Retirement Pay and Equitable Division in Di-
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way'3 7 held that the federal preemption doctrine foreclosed a state
court from making a determination of the beneficiary of the proceeds
of a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance policy which was inconsistent
with the declaration of the deceased servicemember.
The limitations on state power imposed by McCarty have been
subsequently removed by Congress in legislation basically declaring
that states may indeed distribute military retirement pay upon divorce
in accordance with their own laws."'8 But a potentially knotty question
now in view of the explicit demise of the federal preemption doctrine
with regard to military nondisability retirement benefits, concerns the
residual effects, if any, of the doctrine on the countless private pensions
which are regulated in a variety of ways by the federal Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (hereinafter ERISA).*89 Notwithstand-
ing "ERISA's restriction on the assignment and alienation of plan ben-
efits covered by the Act," it seems to be generally accepted that there
are no genuine federal preemption problems with respect to ERISA-
regulated pension benefits, in contrast with "pension rights that origi-
nate directly from federal pension legislation."' 4 This is highly signifi-
cant, for a judicial determination that the anti-assignment provisions of
ERISA preempted state family property laws would remove a major
marital asset from the realm of marital and community property."'
This, in turn, would undoubtedly hamper the states' efforts in tailoring
vorce Court Preemption, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 280, 288 (1982). See also Note, McCarty v. Mc-
Carty: The Battle Over Military Nondisability Retirement Benefits, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 335
(1982).
137. 454 U.S. 46 (1981). Two commentators have explained the Court's apparent departure
from the test for preemption announced in Hisquierdo in both McCarty and Ridgway on the basis
of judicial deference to Congress' constitutional power to regulate military affairs. See Bierman
and Hershberger, supra note 136, at 54.
138. The anti-McCarty legislation is referred to as the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act and is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1450 (1982). It was signed into law by
President Reagan on September 8, 1982.
Congress' swift action in clearly making military retirement benefits subject to division by
states pursuant to their marital or community property laws was consistent with earlier legislation
concerning civil service retirement benefits. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345j) (Supp. V 1981).
139. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
140. Note, Pension Rights As Marital Property: A Flexible Approach, supra note 101, at
250. Various court decisions illustrate the apparent attitude on the part of the Court that this is
not a legitimate federal question. See, e.g., Campa v. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr
362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) and Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85
Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr 551 (1978), appeal dismissed and cert. denied 444 U.S. 1028
(1980). But see Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also
Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Mar-
riage of Brown and ERISA, 25 UCLA L. REV. 417, 519-22 (1978).
141. DuCanto, supra note 87.
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a fair and equitable division of marital or community property at mari-
tal dissolution.14 2
B. Professional Degrees and Licenses
"'Putting hubby through' college, law school, medical school or other
educational program ('getting a Ph.T,' as it is sometimes called), ap-
pears to be a firmly entrenched American institution, despite the
women's liberation movement."''
As an addendum, it might be underscored that the denouement to
the above described scenario is frequently unpleasant: generally, the
husband, shortly after obtaining the advanced academic degree, con-
cludes that he has had enough of being married to the wife and conse-
quently seeks a divorce." 4 The dissolution of a marriage between a
husband who has received a professional degree and/or license and a
wife, 4 5 who may have forsaken her own career goals and aspirations so
142. Adopting federal preemption principles with respect to private pension plans subject to
ERISA would probably make it necessary for Congress to act in much the same fashion as it did
when it overruled the preemption determination in McCarty.
In the totally unrelated area of fair employment practices legislation, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that a state (New York) human rights law was preempted by ERISA
inasmuch as the New York law prohibited a certain aspect of an employee benefits plan that was
permitted by federal law. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
Although this decision has no direct precedential value as far as the question of ERISA preemp-
tion of state family property law is concerned, it does indicate a willingness by the Supreme Court
to deal with an ERISA preemption issue that clearly involves a federal question.
See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 725 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1983).
But see Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1983), where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that ERISA's proscription
against the alienation or assignment of pension plan benefits did not preempt a Wisconsin court
order concerning the division of the pension rights of a former spouse.
143. Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the "Realization of Educational Goals: How the
Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 948 n.4 (1978) quoted in Note, Family
Law: Ought A Professional Degree Be Divisible As Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 517, 543 n.144 (1981).
144. This sequence of events has become so commonplace in our society that it has been
occasionally referred to as the 'putting the hubby through' syndrome. See Raggio, Professional
Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Dissolution of
Marriage, 16 FAM. L. Q. 147 (1982). A poignant description of the consequential effect of this
pattern of conduct has been expressed as follows: "the student spouse will walk away with a
degree and the supporting spouse will depart with little more than the knowledge that he or she
has substantially contributed toward the attainment of that degree." Comment, The Interest of
the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590 (1974).
145. Although it is quite conceivable that the supporting spouse may be the husband, re-
search has actually reflected that it is more likely that the student spouse in this situation will be
the husband, and the supporting spouse will be the wife. See Erickson, supra note 143, at 949,
where the commentator reveals that no individual case involving a husband as the supporting
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that the husband might pursue his education, "presents courts with dif-
ficult questions with regard to property division."" 6
Normally, the marital assets at the time of dissolution are minis-
cule because they generally have been depleted to finance the hus-
band's educational pursuits." Consequently, there are few conven-
tional marital assets available for distribution between the spouses. 14 8
Moreover, in many jurisdictions, alimony is not readily available to a
wife who is capable of supporting herself.149 Hence, a wife who has
been supporting a student spouse quite likely will experience some ex-
treme difficulty in convincing a court of her need for alimony.150 As a
result, under traditional concepts of property division and alimony inci-
dent to divorce, the wife who supports her husband through school and
who is suddenly faced with the specter of divorce may be in the unenvi-
able position of getting no recompense for her investment in the hus-
band's professional degree (education), license, or enhanced potential
future earning capacity.151 In other words, the husband walks away
from the marriage with his professional degree in hand while the wife
is left with a worthless "Ph.T." By permitting this result, do courts
actually do violence to the letter and spirit of their respective marital or
spouse was uncovered by her investigation. And, to date, this writer's research has not revealed a
single case either. See also Mullinex, The Value of An Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy.
L.A.L. Rev. 227, 229 n.7 (1983) ("No reported case has involved a husband who asked the court
for some recompense for his support or contributions to a wife's pursuit of an educational de-
gree"). See also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, 1067 n.4, rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
146. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294, 1295 (1981).
147. Note, Disposition of Professional Degree Upon Marriage Dissolution: DeLa Rosa v.
DeLa Rosa, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1982). Although the arguments that a professional
degree, license, or increased earning capacity is divisible property upon divorce are more compel-
ling when the student spouse is a recent graduate and there are no other tangible marital assets to
speak of, these same contentions should probably be made "where the marriage has continued
years after graduation and professional goodwill and tangible assets have accumulated." Raggio,
supra note 144, at 148.
148. The potentially inequitable ramifications of the paucity of marital assets at dissolution
will be addressed later in this Article. See infra notes 149-152.
149. In Arkansas, for example, a wife who is able-bodied and capable of working to support
herself has a very slim-perhaps nil-chance of receiving an alimony award. See Mobley, The
Arkansas Divorce-Do We Have Problems?, supra note 61, at 616.
150. See Mullinex, supra note 145, at 231, citing a number of cases and a study which
reflects the niggardly attitude that some courts have adopted in terms of awarding alimony to
able-bodied women. Id. at 231 n.9.
However, in McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Ky. App. 1983) the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to award $10,000 in lump sum maintenance to
the non-professional wife without specifically making any allowance on the basis of the wife's
contributions to the husband's professional degree.
151. Note, supra note 143, at 544.
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community property laws and thus betray their inherent equitable
powers? 62
1. The Judicial Treatment of the Issue
Surprisingly, a relatively small number of courts have addressed
the question of whether a professional degree, license, or the enhanced
earning capacity arising from the possession of the education or license
is property subject to apportionment upon divorce.1 53 The resolution of
the complicated issue engenders some important questions.
As a threshold matter, courts must ascertain whether a degree,
license, or enhanced earning capacity is includible under the rubric of
property within the meaning of a state's marital or community property
law. In the majority of cases, the courts seem to resolve the issue in the
negative 54 with the most commonly stated reasons being that: (1) they
have no exchange or barter value; (2) they are personal to the posses-
sor; (3) they are not susceptible to ownership; and (4) they do not sur-
vive the death of the holder.5 6 Because these attributes of property are
not present, neither the professional degree, license, nor enhanced earn-
ing capacity has been defined by the majority of courts as a marital
asset subject to distribution upon divorce. 16
152. A writer has commented upon this legal dilemma as follows: "One such economic prob-
lem of divorce for which the law has failed to devise an equitable solution is the problem of the
wife who supports her husband through school and then finds herself confronted with a divorce
proceeding." Erickson, supra note 143, at 947.
153. Note, supra note 143, at 524.
154. See Note, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Com-
pensating Spousal Contributions, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 301, 303 n.8 (1983), and Note, The
North Carolina Act For Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
735, 748 (1982). This unsettled area of the law can be a mixed blessing for an attorney. See
Raggio, supra note 144, at 148-49.
155. Note, Property Division-License to Practice Dentistry Is Marital Property Subject to
Division. Inman v. Inman, 578 S. W.2d 266, (Ky. App. 1979), 17 J. FAM. L. 826, 827-28 (1978).
See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, _ 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1982) (medical
degree was not property for purpose of divorce under community property laws because it was not
susceptible to ownership in common, was not transferable, and was not capable of surviving the
death of the holder); and In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
156. See Note, supra note 154, at 303 n.8. The failure by the majority of courts to broaden
the definition of "property" to embrace a professional degree, license, or enhanced earning capac-
ity is somewhat incongruous with their apparent willingness to bring economic concepts like good-
will and pension rights within the parameters of property. See Krauskopf, Recompense for Fi-
nancing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U.
KAN. L. REV. 379, 412 (1980). Professor Krauskopf refers to "[t]he development of earning ca-
pacity through the education of the spouse. . .[as] 'marriage specific capital.'" Id. at 387. More-
over, she postulates that this human capital can be as easily encompassed within the meaning of
property as have goodwill and pension rights, its economic counterparts. Id. at 412.
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A minority of courts has recognized that a professional degree, li-
cense, or increased earning capacity is property."' To do so has neces-
sitated that the courts adopt an expansive definition of property con-
gruent with "the special characteristics of both a divorce proceeding
and a professional education." 15 8 Furthermore, these courts have been
guided by the basic principles that (1) "property is that bundle of
rights that the courts recognize as property;" and that (2) "[i]n order
to make the determination that a thing is property, the court should
ask whether as a matter of policy, the definition of property should
include a particular concept."15 9 In other words, to prevent a gross in-
justice in the typical "putting your hubby through" case, it may be
quite appropriate and indeed essential "to find a property interest for
the holder's spouse in a professional degree."160
2. So what if it is property?
Although a professional degree, license, or increased future earn-
ing capacity may get past the threshold hurdle of being classified as
property, formidable obstacles may still foreclose a judicial determina-
tion that either is a marital asset capable of being separately divided
between the parties upon marital dissolution. For example, it is gener-
ally vital that these marital assets have some non-speculative value
which will allow the court to equitably distribute them between the
husband and the wife.1 61
157. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Inman v.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885
(Iowa 1978).
158. Note, supra note 143, at 542.
159. Id.
160. Inman v. Inman, supra note 157, at 266. But see Leveck v. Leveck. 614 S.W.2d 710
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981), where Inman is factually distinguished by the court. And see Inman v.
Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982) (Inman II) where the Kentucky Supreme Court stated
emphatically that a professional degree was not a species of marital property. However, in a sub-
sequent decision, McGowan v. McGowan, supra note 150, at 223-24, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals concluded that a non-professional, contributing spouse could quite possibly be assisted in
connection with the division of marital property pursuant to the Kentucky marital property statute
by either (1) the contribution to the acquisition of marital property or (2) economic circumstances
of each spouse equitable distribution criteria, or both. The court rebuffed, however, the suggestion
that an automatic lump-sum monetary award based upon a prescribed formula was an appropriate
remedy "in those dissolution cases where one of the spouses has worked so that the other can
acquire a degree." Id. at 223. The prescribed formula alluded to was stated as dictum in Inman v.
Inman, 648 S.W.2d at 852. (Inman I).
161. One court has observed that "includability, valuation, and the percentage of equitable
distribution of assets are separate questions." O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, __, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1982). Putting this in proper perspective, a commentator has noted that "[i]f
such partner (supporting spouse) is to receive fair compensation for her forced retirement, the
UALR LAW JOURNAL
One view which is shared by some courts is that a professional
degree, license, or enhanced earning capacity does not have any tangi-
ble value.'O' At most, the reasoning goes, these marital assets have
"only an intangible or intellectual value" which cannot be converted
into a specific monetary amount capable of being distributed between
the parties at divorce.16 Basically, what this amounts to is a determi-
nation that this species of property is not divisible because no reasona-
bly certain value can be assigned to allow its apportionment between
the parties.'" Of course, the natural rejoinder is to point to those items
which are just as speculative and intangible but which courts have, nev-
ertheless, found to be valuable, divisible marital assets. Some classic
examples are "professional goodwill, pension benefits, and tort actions
for personal injury and wrongful death for loss of future earning capac-
ity."' 65 Moreover, it has been opined that the difficulty associated with
quantifying the value of a professional degree, license, or enhanced
earning capacity should not be used by courts to abdicate their respon-
sibility to fashion an equitable distribution. I6 As a matter of fact, a
court's refusal to countenance a professional degree, license, or en-
hanced earning capacity as a marital asset capable of having an as-
sessed value which can be distributed between the parties upon divorce
arguably undermines the partnership theory of equitable distribu-
tion-namely, that "each spouse is entitled to gain from his or her
input."' 167
Even those jurisdictions which have held that a professional de-
gree, license, or enhanced earning capacity is separately divisible prop-
erty have devised methods of valuation and distribution which have
generally simply furthered, but not fully advanced, the partnership the-
ory. 68 The methodology has invariably failed to truly provide the
value of that license to the community must be determined." Note, Horstmann v. Horstmann'
Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DENVER L. J. 677, 685 (1979).
For an in-depth discussion of the issues surrounding the valuation question, see Mullenix, supra
note 145, at 227. ("Inevitably, in awarding compensation to the supporting spouse, courts have
been confronted with the difficult task of quantifying either the worth of the education or the
value of the spouse's support.") Id. at 236.
162. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
163. Note, supra note 143, at 544.
164. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.2d at , 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135; and In re Mar-
riage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rept. 668, 677 (1979).
165. Note, supra note 143, at 545.
166. Raggio, supra note 144, at 160.
167. Note, The North Carolina Act For Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, supra
note 154, at 748.
168. See. e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d at 885, where although the court
ruled that the increased potential earning capacity derived from a professional degree or license
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working marital partner with full compensation for the beneficial prop-
erty expectations which have been dashed by the dissolution of the
marriage and has consequently failed to achieve a fair and equitable
property division.'69
For example, a perusal of the court decisions that have considered
the question of molding an appropriate remedy in the "putting the
hubby through" cases reflects that virtually all the remedies are not
based on property-division concepts but are simply grounded upon ad
hoc considerations of what is deemed to be equitable.17 0 Understanda-
bly, this analysis is adhered to by those courts which reject the idea
that a professional degree, license, or enhanced earning capacity is a
species of property.' 7 ' But several jurisdictions which ostensibly recog-
was marital property, it fashioned a remedy which in essence only allowed the recovery of those
costs incurred by the working spouse in regard to the student spouse's education. This failed to
fully compensate the working spouse for the gain derived by the family unit from her input, for
she was not compensated for her unfulfilled expectations of a better standard of living as a result
of the increased potential earning capacity of her husband.
169. In many cases, the courts have attempted to provide some form of equitable relief. It is
this writer's opinion, however, that the various remedies have often not compensated the support-
ing spouse for his or her property expectations. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979). But see Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
170. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980) (property
right subject to equitable offset), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div.), rev'd 91
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
171. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, -, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (1982), where the
court enumerates several judicial decisions which have rebuffed the contention that a marital
property interest was involved with respect to a professional degree, license, or increased earning
capacity, but nevertheless reimbursed the supporting spouse "for her financial contributions used
by the supported spouse in obtaining a degree." The basic reasoning of these determinations has
been that it would be grossly unfair to allow the holder of the degree to escape without repaying
the spouse who provided the financial resources which enabled him to obtain it. In Mahoney,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not endorse a cost reimbursement remedy in all
cases. Rather, the court limited its holding in this manner:
Where a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his spouse's support in obtaining a
professional degree or license with the understanding that future benefits will accrue
and inure to both of them, and the marriage is then terminated without the supported
spouse giving anything in return, an unfairness has occurred that calls for a remedy.
(emphasis added).
Id. at 533.
The supreme court designated its remedy as reimbursement alimony indicating that it "should
cover all financial contributions towards the former spouse's education, including household ex-
penses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by the supported
spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license." Id. at 534. In a companion decision, Hill v. Hill,
91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537, 538 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court added rehabilitative
alimony to reimbursement alimony as alternative remedies in "putting your hubby through" situa-
tions. Rehabilitative alimony was defined by the court as "a short-term or lump-sum award from
one party in a divorce [which] will enable his former spouse to complete the preparation necessary
for economic self-sufficiency." Id. at 538. Additionally, in cases where there are other available
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nize that these professional items are marital assets divisible under
their respective property distribution laws have also generally fashioned
remedies which actually subvert the traditional concepts of property.'
The most commonly utilized remedy or method of valuation is the
restitution approach where the working spouse is basically awarded
recompense for the funds which have been paid for the student spouse's
professional education. 73 Courts have the discretion to make adjust-
ments for inflation and to decree the payment of interest as well. 174 As
noted earlier, 17 5 this remedy does not compensate the working spouse
for the value of the degree, license, or enhanced earning capacity. It is
simply a feeble attempt to prevent unjust enrichment. 17
marital assets, the enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse and contributions made by the
supporting spouse can be factors considered in connection with the traditional division of marital
property. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975). Of course, they
may also be considered under the rubric of "a separate continuing alimony obligation." See, e.g.,
Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539, 542 (1982) ("both an initial lump-sum award of
reimbursement . . . and a separate continuing obligation would be appropriate.").
172. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d at 885, and Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d at 269, where the courts assigned property status to the supported spouse's increased
earning capacity and dental license, respectively; but they awarded relief-basically in the form of
cost reimbursement or restitution-which was equitable, not legal, and which did not compensate
the working spouse for the value of the "property" involved.
But see O'Brien v. O'Brien 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982), where a New York
Superior Court, in determining the value of a medical license which it had held to be distributable
property, relied on the plaintiff's expert who concluded that the present value of the plaintiff's
medical license was $472,000. The expert "capitalized the earning differential between a college
graduate, and the earnings of a general surgeon over the productive life expectancy of the plaintiff
in arriving at the present value of the plaintiff's medical license of $472,000." Id. at 806. Forsak-
ing the contributions which the defendant spouse had made toward the plaintiffs medical educa-
tion, the court apportioned the value of the medical license between the parties and awarded the
defendant $188,000 which was 40% of the license's present value. This appears to be compensa-
tion based on the value of the license and is thus property-based. See Note, Equitable Distribu-
tion of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions, supra
note 154, at 308.
Illustrating the lack of concensus in this area, another New York decision, Lesman v. Lesman,
88 A.D.2d 153, _, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (1982) reached the exact opposite conclusion as
O'Brien and held that a professional degree or license was not property. The distinguishing feature
of the two cases is that the supporting spouse in O'Brien had made a meaningful financial contri-
bution to the student husband, while the wife in Lesman had not. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114
Misc.2d at 236, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
173. Note, Divorce After Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May
be Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 335 (1979). See, e.g., In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
174. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 269-70, cited in Mullenix, supra note 145, at 244.
175. See supra note 172.
176. See Mullenix, supra note 145, at 267 ("This calculation provides the supporting spouse
with no return on his or her investment-an unfair result."). But one commentator has espoused
the opposite view and has suggested that "[a] return of the contributions made to the attainment
of the degree or license is preferable because it avoids the possibility of awarding a questionable
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Another approach is the cost value method which takes into ac-
count not only the direct costs of the education but the "cost opportu-
nity" of the education (the indirect costs) as well.17 If expressed as a
formula, this approach can be articulated in this manner: "Direct
Purchase Cost + Cost Opportunity = 'Cost' Value of Education. ' 17 8
A final method of valuation is the earning capacity value ap-
proach. Under this approach, expert testimony is "employed to deter-
mine the difference in earning potentials between a spouse with a pro-
fessional education and the same spouse without that education. 17 9 A
similar approach was adopted in O'Brien v. O'Brien,180 the New York
case discussed earlier. This approach, although not perfect, more
clearly personifies a property remedy than any of the others.181 Yet,
percentage of unpredictable future earnings since evidence of the actual contributions made is
more amendable to concrete proof." Note, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two
Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions, supra note 154, at 317-18. In support of
this position, the commentator proffers the "following formula":
non-student spouse's (student spouse's








177. Comment, supra note 144, at 603.
178. Id. at 604.
179. Note, supra note 173, at 335.
180. 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (1982). (The differential was "capitalized
. . . over the productive life expectancy" of the student spouse.) See also Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J.
510, 453 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982) ("The capitalized, discounted value of the differential
in the earning capacity of a male with a four year college degree and a specialist in internal
medicine that capitalized, discounted difference being the value of the medical education and
license received.) This is referred to as the discount method and is criticized in Mullenix, supra
note 145, at 267-68.
181. To be sure, some jurisdictions attempt to avoid the difficulties associated with the deter-
minations of property, valuation, or distribution by dealing with these questions more traditionally
in connection with alimony or general distribution of marital assets. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 645
S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ($12,000 lump sum maintenance award in lieu of marital prop-
erty division of professional degree) and Conner v. Conner, 10 FAM. L. RPTR. 1063 (1983), where
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that a husband's Master in Public Ad-
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because of the difficulties attendant to placing a monetary value on this
"new" property, it has been suggested that courts discontinue this ef-
fort and "assess the worth of education based on an older theory of
value: the labor theory of value." '182
C. The Goodwill of A Professional Practice
The salient issues involved in the determination of whether profes-
sional goodwill is distributable property upon marital dissolution are
strikingly similar-if not virtually identical-to those previously ex-
amined in connection with the divisibility at divorce of a professional
degree, license, or increased earning capacity. They are: (1) Is profes-
sional goodwill a species of property capable of division upon marital
dissolution? and (2) If professional goodwill is an item of property, how
is its value to be determined so that it can be divided between the
spouses upon divorce?1 88
In ascertaining whether professional goodwill'" is property for the
purpose of divorce litigation, courts have focused upon the rudimentary
question of whether it is endowed with the attributes of property,1 8
which have been primarily described as (1) transferability and (2) the
ministration and Master in Business Administration degrees were not marital property but were
simply economic factors to determine the husband's ability to pay alimony. See also Krauskopf,
supra note 156, at 415, where the writer opts for the remedy of in gross maintenance in lieu of a
property classification theory. Moreover, the commentator amplifies her position by stating that
"the court should consider not only restitution for the monetary contribution, but also fulfillment
of the expectation of return in proportion to the amount of investment." Id. at 417.
182. Mullenix, supra note 145, at 275. Under this theory, "all the court need do is to look to
the labor time of the student spouse in order to determine value. The supporting spouse, as marital
partner, is then entitled to one half that value." Id. at 280. "In real terms, this would mean that
the supporting spouse would receive one-half of the other spouse's income, for a number of years
equivalent to those needed to acquire the degree or license." Id. at 283.
183. Raggio, supra note 144, at 147.
184. A classic definition of goodwill was articulated by Justice Story who defined it as "[t]he
advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of capital,
stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and
encouragement, which it received from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local
position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other
accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." Note,
supra note 143, at 545 n.155, quoting from J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership §
99 (1968).
A more concise, yet equally accurate, definition of goodwill is that it is an "expectation of
future patronage." Note, supra note 173, at 334. See also In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash.
App. 481, 483, 558 P.2d 279, 280 (1976) and Scribner, Professional Goodwill in Dissolution
Proceedings: The Personification of Property, 17 GONz. L. REV. 303, 319 (1982).
185. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez 38 Cal. App.3d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974)
and Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
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ability to be assigned a value. 8 In view of these criteria, some have
fervently contended that professional "[g]oodwill is not property" be-
cause "[i]t lacks all indicia of property. '187 For example, in Nail v.
Nail,1 88 the Texas Supreme Court held that the "accrued" goodwill of
a spouse's medical practice was not property for the purpose of division
upon divorce, reasoning that it lacked the essential characteristics of
property.18 9
However, Nail does not represent the mainstream of current legal
thought. In the overwhelming majority of cases, professional goodwill,
unlike a professional degree, license, or enhanced earning capacity, 19 0 is
considered to be a distinct marital asset subject to division upon di-
vorce. 91 And it has been labelled as being distributable property not-
186. Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 410.
187. Scribner, supra note 184, at 327. The commentator attacks the treatment of profes-
sional goodwill as divisible property upon divorce not only on the basis that it is not property, but
also with respect to the specter of double recovery, denial of equal protection and the presence of
existing statutes which provide an adequate remedy without prostituting the concept of property.
Id. at 326-27. But see Note, supra note 10, at 565, wherein the writer opines that "[p]rofessional
goodwill, although derived from personal skills, often is as saleable and transferable as commercial
goodwill."
188. 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
189. In Nail, the cornerstone of the court's reasoning is embodied in this description of medi-
cal professional goodwill:
It did not possess value or constitute an asset separate and apart from his person or
from his individual ability to practice his profession. It would be extinguished in event
of his death, or retirement, or disablement, as well as in the event of the sale of his
practice or the loss of his patients, whatever the cause. . . . That is would have value in
the future is no more than an expectancy wholly dependent upon the continuation of
existing circumstances.
Id. at 764.
But see Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) and Trick v. Trick,
587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), where Nail is distinguished on the shadowy basis that it
involved the goodwill of a sole practitioner rather than that of a professional corporation or associ-
ation, the former being personal and the latter not being so. Thus, the professional goodwill of a
medical corporation and a medical association was treated as marital assets upon divorce in Gees-
breght and Trick, respectively. See also Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290, (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
where another gloss is placed on Nail by the court's holding that once a sole practitioner disposes
of its goodwill it acquires value and qualifies as a marital asset.
190. Some commentators have seriously questioned this disparate treatment, arguing that a
professional degree, license, or increased potential earning capacity is no more nebulous and amor-
phous with respect to transfer and valuation than is professional goodwill. See, e.g., Krauskopf,
supra note 156, at 411. These comparisons of speculativeness have also been made in regard to
"pension and retirement benefits, and personal injury or wrongful death awards for lost future
earning capacity." Note, supra note 143, at 545.
191. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 257, 331 A.2d 257, 261 n.5 (1975) (a common-law
jurisdiction recognizing that the goodwill of a law firm was a divisible marital asset upon dissolu-
tion). See also Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75. Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); Meuller v.
Meuller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324,
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withstanding that it is admittedly "elusive, intangible, difficult to evalu-
ate and will ordinarily require special disposition."1 "
To include professional goodwill under the caption of property is
one thing; however, to assign a value to it is another. Here again, it is
evident that "determining its value presents difficulties." 193 Yet, in the
majority of cases, the courts have not considered this apparent diffi-
culty to be a cogent basis for excluding professional goodwill as a divis-
ible marital asset.1" As one commentator has noted:
Methods of placing a value on professional goodwill vary according to
the circumstances of each case. Factors considered by the courts when
valuing the goodwill of a professional practice include the length of
time that the professional spouse has practiced, the comparative suc-
cess of the spouse's professional practice, the professional spouse's age
and health, the past profits of the practice, the fixed resources of the
practice, and the physical assets of the practice.195
That this approach may engender some uncertainty, unpredictabil-
ity, and confusion with respect to valuing professional goodwill is evi-
dent. Commenting on the California experience, it has been observed
that a court there is impelled to engage in pure "conjecture as to what
would be the goodwill value of his (the professional's) practice, if he
sold it and if someone bought it if there was a market therefore at the
time of the dissolution."" But it appears that California courts have
588 P.2d 1136 (1979); In re Marriage of Kaplan, 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979); In re
Marriage of Freedman, 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 (1979); and In re Marriage of Lukens,
16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
But see, Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 350-51, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354-55 (Ct. App.
1981), and Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. App.2d 456, 463, 648 P.2d 218, 223-24 (1982), where the
view that professional goodwill is divisible property is soundly rejected.
192. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974). See also
Mullinex, supra note 145, at 259, where, declaring that goodwill is actually "an intangible asset,"
the commentator still espoused the view that "goodwill and educational degrees should be recog-
nized as intangible property assets, capable of valuation upon divorce." In a similar vein, in Lit-
man v. Litman, 95 A.D.2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1983), a New York court held that
the husband's law practice was a marital asset capable of being equitably distributed at divorce.
Eschewing contentions that proscriptions against the alienation of a law practice embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility precluded subjecting a law practice to equitable distribution,
the court concluded that the law practice could be equitably divided by way of awarding a distrib-
utive share--that is, the provision of "a sum of money in lieu of an actual distribution of prop-
erty." 463 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
193. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. at 340, 331 A.2d at 261 n.5.
194. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d at - 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
195. Note, supra note 143, at 546.
196. Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or Another Name
for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27 (1977). The writer does a good job of synthesizing the Califor-
nia cases and concludes that, if there were a rule of valuation in California with respect to profes-
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been admonished to determine hypothetical market value in marital
dissolution cases "with considerable care and caution. ' 197 Because pro-
fessional goodwill is oftentimes a very significant marital asset,198
courts should follow the lead of California and other states in exercis-
ing extreme caution in regard to valuation, while at the same time in-
cluding the value of professional goodwill within the pale of divisible
niarital or community property upon divorce."9'
D. The Homemaker's Services
A noteworthy feature of the UMDA is its recognition of the
value-both monetary and nonmonetary-of the services of a home-
maker in the acquisition of the marital estate and the concomitant con-
sideration of this factor in making a fair and equitable allocation of the
marital property between the spouses.200 This is a significant develop-
ment which has been widely accepted by a large number of states.2 01
More importantly, the consideration of this criterion personifies "the
concept of marriage as a partnership." 02 The court's responsiveness to
this principle is evidenced by the following comment:
It gives recognition to the essential supportive role played by the wife
in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and mother she
should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets accumulated dur-
ing the marriage. Thus the division of property upon divorce is re-
sponsive to the concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint
sional goodwill, it would be "that each case stands on its own." Id. at 83.
See also Norton, Professional Goodwill-Its Value in California Marital Dissolution Cases,
3 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 9 (1976), for a good discussion of the various methods of valuing profes-
sional goodwill.
197. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.3d at Ill, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
198. Note, supra note 10, at 555. ("Excluding professional goodwill from marital assets can
greatly affect the value of the distributable property.")
199. Id. at 574. ("The principles of marital partnership and fair division of property, which
underlie the equitable distribution statutes, compel this result").
200. UMDA § 307(1) (1970), 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979). See also Note, supra note 2, at 679.
Under the ancient common-law system, the contributions of a homemaker are not looked upon
with as much regard as the financial provisions of the breadwinner. As one commentator has
stated, expressing an almost apparent sigh of relief: "The venerable common law property sys-
tem. . .survives in only a few states." Foster, supra note 35, at 9.
201. Some recent statistics reflect that as many as 28 states now weigh the homemaker's
services in regard to division of property and/or alimony. See Freed and Foster, supra note 42, at
246. The contributions of a homemaker are now placed on the same plane as the financial contri-
butions of a breadwinner. Note, The Displaced Homemaker and the Divorce Process in Wiscon-
sin, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 941, 951 (1982).
202. Cohn, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Year Later, 27 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV.
527, 541 (1981).
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undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership."'
Because a sizable number of jurisdictions now consider the contri-
butions and services of a homemaker in arriving at an equitable distri-
bution, 2"' a knotty problem exists in regard to valuing the nonmonetary
portion of these services. In other words, how do you evaluate this
worth in terms of dollars and cents? 05 There is no consensus appar-
ently as to the proper mode of valuation, and this is somewhat to be
expected in an area fraught with controversy. A methodology that has
recently garnered a fair amount of notoriety is the "replacement cost"
approach. 0 It operates primarily on the theory of identifying the jobs
that the homemaker performs and then ascertaining how much it
would cost to pay a third person to do them at a prescribed hourly rate
for the number of hours that the homemaker spends doing the tasks.20
The adept utilization of this approach by a homemaker's lawyer may
result in some fantastic totals;208 but a very real problem inherent in
these astronomical figures is that the court may reject them as being
too speculative or unrealistic.2 0 9
Another approach which has received some adherence210 is re-
ferred to as the "opportunity lost" approach. Basically, this approach
provides that where the spouse has been stymied--either economically
or socially-by being a homemaker during the marriage, then the
spouse is entitled to remuneration and perhaps additional education, if
necessary, to eventually become financially independent. 11 Apparently,
203. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974). See also Fuerst v.
Fuerst, 93 Wis.2d 121, 286 N.W.2d 861, 866 (1979) (considering "economic and equitable fac-
tors related to homemaking" . . . is congruent with Wisconsin law).
204. See supra note 201.
205. Foster, supra note 35, at 41. The commentator opines that, despite these valuation diffi-
culties, the nonmonetary contributions and services of a homemaker should still be evaluated by
courts because of their importance in vindicating the partnership theory of marriage. Id. at 41.
See also Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17 FAM.
L. Q. 41, 49-53 (1983) for a fairly good, cogent discussion of the principal method for valuing a
homemaker's service.
206. This mode of evaluation has gained widespread attention largely due to the inventive
efforts of Michael Minton, an attorney who has represented several female homemakers. See Ark.
Gazette, Oct. 1, 1980, at lB.
207. Foster, supra note 35, at 42.
208. In Mr. Minton's charts, for example, he arrives at an incredibly large dollar amount for
the monetary worth of homemaker services and contributions. ("a weekly value of $793.79 and a
yearly value of $41,277.08-which is a lot more than the average husband earns.") Ark. Gazette,
Oct. 1, 1980, at lB.
209. Foster, supra note 35, at 45.
210. Wisconsin has adopted statutorily the replacement cost approach. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.255(3) (West 1981).
211. Foster, supra note 35, at 45-46.
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this methodology is more appropriate for those situations involving a
long-standing marriage where the homemaker spouse has no marketa-
ble skills and, moreover, no real prospect of acquiring them, making it
well-nigh impossible for that spouse to acquire gainful employment.' 12
Additionally, in those cases where a spouse has curtailed his or her
educational pursuits to become a homemaker and now wants to con-
tinue the quest for further education, the "opportunity lost" approach
seems to have some utility.218 Here too, a significant degree of inherent
speculation is a possible drawback to this approach. " "
Finally, there are some proponents of an "eclectic" approach. 215
As reflected by its designation, this approach draws from several
sources, including, under appropriate circumstances, "replacement
cost" and "opportunity lost". But it dispenses with the "sugar-coating"
and presents a straightforward, unpretentious account of the home-
maker's daily routine, hoping to convince the court of her true value to
the family unit. 16
There will continue to be some disagreement as to whether home-
maker contributions and services should be considered in making an
equitable distribution. If the present trend continues, however, the
number of states authorizing the consideration of this equitable crite-
rion will steadily grow. A more difficult, and perhaps more debatable,
question concerns the method of evaluating the homemaker services
standard, especially in regard to nonmonetary contributions. Here
again, the battle will undoubtedly persist. A victory by the pro-home-
maker forces, however, will be a victory for the partnership theory of
marriage and, in turn, another proper step toward progressiveness in
marital property division.
E. Classifying the Increase in Value of Separate Property
Several presumptive equal and equitable distribution of marital
property statutes contain provisions which address the question of how
to treat the appreciation in value during the marriage of separate prop-
erty. 17 And there is clearly no consensus among the states. 2 8 In fact, a
212. Id. at 46.
213. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, -, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (1975)
(". .. she merely seeks for herself the same opportunity which she helped give to the defendant.")
214. Foster, supra note 35, at 46. The "opportunity lost" approach has been plagued by
highly inflated dollar projections, too.
215. Id. at 47.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-13(4) (1973 & 1982) (the increase in value is
marital property.) This apparently represents a departure from the prior law in Colorado. See In
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surprisingly significant divergence of opinion exists in regard to this
troublesome question.21 9
The various approaches adopted in one form or another by the
states can be delineated as follows: (1) the increase in value of separate
property is marital property;220  (2) the increase is separate
(nonmarital) property; 21 (3) the increase is marital property to the ex-
tent that it is an outgrowth of substantial contributions made by the
spouse who is asserting a marital property interest therein;222 (4) the
re Wilden, 39 Colo. App. 189, 563 P.2d 384, 386 (1977). See also In re Marriage of Lester, -
Colo. App. -, 647 P.2d 688, 691 (Colo. App. 1982) and In re Marriage of Campbell, 43 Colo.
App. 72, -, 599 P.2d 275, 276 (Colo. App. 1982).
But see e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(3) (1974) (the increase in value of property
acquired prior to marriage is considered to be separate property). While construing the Delaware
statute in Halsey B.S. v. Charlotte S.S., 419 A.2d 962, 964 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1980), the Delaware
Family Court held that "[d]ividends received on stock during the course of the marriage are not
an increase in value of the stock and thus excludable from marital property."
Typically, separate property means property acquired either before the marriage, or by gift,
inheritance, devise, or descent, or in exchange for property that was acquired by gift, inheritance,
devise or descent, or that was acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage.
218. Both the case law and statutory law reflect the diverse ways in which the "increase in
value of separate property" factor has been handled. This may be some indication of how arduous
the task is to classify the increase in value of separate property. See. e.g., supra note 217.
219. See, e.g., supra note 217. Although Colorado and Delaware are at opposite ends of the
spectrum, a number of states are either aligned with one of them or somewhere in between.
220. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(3)(a)(1) and (e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1983) (the
"increase in value during the marriage" of "property acquired in exchange for property acquired
prior to the marriage" or of "property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent" is marital
property).
221. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (B)(5) (Supp. 1983), Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.330(2)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1983); and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2) (E) (1964).
222. In re Marriage of Kennedy, 94 Ill. App.3d 537, -, 418 N.E.2d 947, 955 (1981). The
enhancement in value which is attributable solely to inflation or natural external factors is
nonmarital property. See In re Marriage of Lee, 87 Ill.2d 64, -, 430 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (1981)
("presumption of marital property was overcome when it was shown that the increase in value of
property acquired before the marriage was substantially attributable to external economic factors
and not any capital improvements made upon the land."); In re Marriage of Komnick, 84 Ill.2d
89, -, 417 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (1981). See also In re Marriage of Reed, 100 Ill. App. 3d 873,
427 N.E.2d 282 (1981) where an Illinois intermediate appellate court held that, while the increase
in value of separate property was separate property, "any income derived from such property
during marriage is deemed marital." Interestingly, the Illinois courts seem to have placed a judi-
cial gloss upon the "increase in value of separate property" exception to marital property. The
pertinent Illinois statutory provision seems to expressly characterize such property as nonmarital.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 503(a) (6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
For other cases adopting the position that the increase in value of premarital property attribu-
table to the nonowner spouse's contributions and efforts is marital property, see In re Marriage of
Brown, 19 Mont. 481, _ 587 P.2d 361, 365 (1978); Von Newkirk v. Von Newkirk, 212 Neb.
730, -, 325 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1982); Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J. Super. 382, 448 A.2d 1035,
1036 (1982); Mob v. Mob, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 370 A.2d 509, 510 (1977); Jolis v. Jolis, N.Y.S.2d
138, 146 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (interpreting the New York statute to mean that a party was entitled to
a share of the appreciation in value only to extent it was due to his "contributions or efforts");
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increase is marital property if it is the product of the commingling of
marital and nonmarital property;23 and (5) those improvements which
contribute to the enhancement of the value of separate property do not
transform that property into marital property, but are equitable distri-
bution factors to be considered in making a fair and equitable division
of the marital property.2 4
These diverse perspectives-judicial and legislative-concerning
the treatment that should be afforded to the increase in value of sepa-
rate property graphically illustrate the complexity of the subject. But
the view which seems most palatable is that which declares that the
increase in value during the marriage of separate property is marital
property. 2 5 Cogent reasons exist for placing this incremental value
within the category of marital property. They are: (1) it advances the
partnership theory of marriage by insuring that the enhancement of
proprietary interests during the course of the marriage is treated as a
Templeton v. Templeton, 565 P.2d 250, 252 (Okla. 1982); May v. May, 596 P.2d 536, 539 (Okla.
1979); and Bowman v. Bowman, 639 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Okla. App. 1981). Moreover, some state
statutes have been judicially interpreted as not excluding from the realm of marital property those
increases in value of premarital property which are attributable to the "efforts of the parties dur-
ing the marriage." The courts have often described these efforts as either "joint" or "team." See.
e.g., Woosman v. Woosman, 587 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), construing Ky. REV.
STAT. 403.190(2)(E) (Supp. 1982). And in Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979),
the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied this qualification to the "increase in value of premarital
property" exception to marital property in a situation where there was barely any discernible
increase in value of the premarital property. Nevertheless, the court discounted this and held that
some value had to be assigned on the theory that the property would certainly have depreciated in
value but for the improvements which were provided.
223. In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill.2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (1981); Westphal v.
Westphal, 99 Ill. App.3d 1042, 426 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1981) (commingling resulted in a transmu-
tation of property from nonmarital to marital).
224. In re Marriage of Null, 608 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The Missouri courts
have consistently repudiated the suggestion that property acquired before marriage (separate
property) can be transformed into marital property by virtue of the non-owner spouse's contribu-
tion of marital or nonmarital assets to the appreciation of the premarital property. See Hull v.
Hull, 591 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) and In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39,
44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("assets which are separate property retain that identity and are not
subject to division by the court regardless of changes in value by appreciation or depreciation.")
Yet it does seem that a value-enhancing contribution to premarital property is a relevant equitable
criterion in Missouri for determining a "just" distribution of the marital property. Hull, 591
S.W.2d at 381. See also Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, __- 184 P.2d 670, 672 (1947),
where this position was endorsed many years ago.
In addition, some state equitable distribution statutes authorize expressly the consideration of
the contributions made by a spouse which appreciate the value of the other spouse's premarital
property as an equitable factor relevant to the division of the marital property. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(8) (Supp. 1983) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(l)(a)(b)(c) (1981)
(factor for disposing of normally excluded property such as gift property, premarital property,
etc.)
225. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-13(4) (1973 & Supp. 1982).
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product of the marriage and (2) the other approaches either do not
vindicate these primordial interests or they compel a court to make
what seems to be an exceedingly complex and somewhat artificial de-
termination of what increase in value of separate property is attributa-
ble to the efforts and contributions of the claimant spouse and what is
not. Furthermore, to treat a spouse's contributions to the appreciation
of the value of separate property as merely an equitable distribution
factor in dividing the marital property fails to truly vindicate the mari-
tal property expectations of the contributing spouse.
F. Ascertaining the Proper Treatment of the Marital Home
Discovering an appropriate means of handling the marital home
upon divorce in either a presumptive equal of equitable distribution of
marital property jurisdiction can sometimes be vexing 26 Consequently,
to nobody's great surprise, the various states have espoused a number
of approaches as to this question. A perusal of the pertinent statutory
and decisional law reflects these disparate modes of treatment: (1) the
marital home is marital property capable of being equitably divided as
would any other species of marital property;22 7 (2) the preference for
awarding ownership or use of the marital home to the parent having
child custody is an equitable criterion to be weighed in arriving at a
fair and equitable distribution of the marital property, including the
marital home;2 28 (3) the marital home, when held in some form of co-
226. The apparent difficulty in arriving at an appropriate method of treating the marital
home stems partially from the failure of many of the marital property statutes to specifically
address the question (see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466-81 (West Supp. 1983); and D.C. Code Ann. § 16-910 (1981)), and from the inherent
difficulty in ascertaining what disposition of the marital home is indeed fair and equitable to the
parties even when a statute explicitly or implicitly alludes to it. Some examples of statutes which
do address the issue of the treatment of the marital home are: (I) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) ("desirability of awarding family home or possession to custodial
party" is an equitable criterion for making an equitable distribution of marital property) and (2)
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(0 (McKinney Supp. 1982) ("the court may make such order regard-
ing the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects. . .without regard to the
form of ownership of such property.")
227. Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("court could, nevertheless,
consider equitable factors. . .in awarding wife a 75 percent interest in the apartment."); Finch v.
Finch, 378 A.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
228. See In re Marriage of Schulke, 40 Colo. App. 473, _ 579 P.2d 90, 93 (1978).
(.no abuse of discretion. . .particularly in awarding the family home to the wife because she
had the responsibility of rearing the five children"); and Collette v. Collette, 177 Conn. 465,
418 A.2d 891, 894 (1979) ("the underlying circumstances confronting the court was felt necessary
to retain the stability of the home for the defendant [wife] and the minor children"). The Con-
necticut statute which seems to have been the underpinning for the Collette decision is CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1983). See also R.E.T. v. A.L.T., 410 A.2d 166, 167
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ownership with rights of survivorship, is not property subject to division
under the general marital property statute; 9 and (4) the marital home
is not apportioned on any consistent doctrinal basis other than perhaps
the shibboleth "fair and equitable under the circumstances.' 3 0
Because of this divergence of opinion among the states on the mar-
ital home issue, the particular manner in which it will be treated upon
marital dissolution may hinge upon the fortuitous circumstance of the
situs of the court in which the action is brought. 13 Although the lack
(Del. 1979), relying upon the pertinent equitable distribution factors outlined in DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1514(a) (1-10) with special emphasis upon the factor in § 1513(a) (8) ("the desirability
of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the party which
with whom any children of the marriage will live"); In re Marriage of Kush, 106 I11. App.3d 233,
-, 435 N.E.2d 921, 923 (II. App. 1982); Stribling v. Stribling, 96 Iil. App.3d 317, 421 N.E.2d
403, (1981); Swinney v. Swinney, 419 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (child custody alone
may support a possession award but not an award of ownership when the residence is the only
"marital asset." (T)here must be "some offsetting factor;" otherwise, "such an award is not just
and reasonable."); In re Marriage of Florke, 270 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1978); Downing v.
Downing, 428 N.E.2d 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Hebron v. Hebron, 566 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Mo.
App. 1978); Smith v. Smith, 561 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App. 1978); McCurry v. McCurry, 202 Neb.
235, -, 274 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1979); Gemigani v. Gemignani, 146 N.J. Super. 278, _ 369
A.2d 942, 945 (App. Div. 1977); Arnold v. Arnold, 30 N.C. App. 683, -, 228 S.E.2d 48, 50
(1976); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, _ 242 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1978); Rogers v. Rogers,
39 N.C. App. 635, -, 251 S.E.2d 663, 665 (N.C. App. 1979); Kostelecky v. Kostelecky, 251
N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D. 1977); Stearns v. Stearns, 80 S.D. 443, 126 N.W.2d 124 (1964); Palmer
v. Palmer, 138 Vt. 412, -, 416 A.2d 143, 145 (1980); Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 49 Md. App.
649, __ 435 A.2d 466, 470 (1981).
229. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981), where the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court ruled that tenancy by the entirety property was not subject to division under
the general marital property statute [ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983)]; rather, it was
subject to equal division under the Arkansas entirety statute [ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1215 (Supp.
1983).] Language in the majority opinion also reflects that if there is a right of survivorship
interest created even though no entirety estate actually exists, then the proprietary interest is not
marital property under § 34-1214, but as a survivorship interest is still subject to the provisions of
the entirety statute (§ 34-1215). Warren, at 535, 623 S.W.2d at 817. But see. e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(c) (1974) ("All property acquired by either party subsequent to the marriage
is presumed to be marital regardless of whether title is held individually or by the parties in some
form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common or tenancy by the entirety."); See
also Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(3) (Supp. 1982), and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-201(b) (1975).
230. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Tierney, 263 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Iowa 1978), although the
"[t]he desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the family home for a
reasonable period to the party having custody of any children" is expressly listed as an equitable
criterion in IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(l)(g) (West. 1981 and Supp. 1983). Other Iowa cases do
reflect analyses grounded upon the statute, however. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Florke, 270
N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1978).
231. A graphic illustration of the significance of the locus of the divorce action can be made
by comparing the operative result that would ensue in one state as contrasted to another if the
property to be divided is a marital home held as a tenancy by the entirety. For example, in Arkan-
sas, a marital home owned as a tenancy by the entirety is not marital property subject to division
under the Arkansas general marital property statute, Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623
S.W.2d 813 (1981), while in Delaware the rule of law is quite the opposite. See DEL. CODE ANN.
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of uniformity engendered by the administration of the diverse divorce
laws of this country is not uncommon, 32 it is still unpalatable when
uncertainty and inconsistency are spawned with respect to the handling
of what is often regarded to be the most valuable marital asset: the
marital home.233 Perhaps serious thought should be given to promulgat-
ing a uniform law specifically delineating the preferred manner of
treatment and status of the marital home under either a presumptive
equal or equitable distribution of marital property law.2  If adopted by
the individual states, this would undoubtedly be a vast improvement
over the current labyrinth of approaches.
G. Defining the Exceptions to General Marital Property
Most, if not all, of the presumptive equal and equitable distribu-
tion of marital property statutes attempt to define "marital prop-
erty"; 235 a concomitant number of specific exceptions to the general
rule of marital property are usually enumerated as well.2"1 The nature
tit. 13, § 1513(c) (1974). And see supra note 229, where the pertinent parts of the Delaware
statute are quoted. See also Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super. 558 398 A.2d 921, 924
(1979) (". . .the marital residence (held as tenants by the entirety) becomes property of the mar-
riage subject to equitable distribution.")
232. Differences among the states in regard to the grounds for divorce, durational residency
requirements and, at one time, child custody jurisdiction rules [the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (in Arkansas, codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2701-34-2725 (Supp. 1983) and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V. 1981) have lessened the dis-
parity] generally have wreaked havoc upon the lives of parties involved in divorce litigation. The
principal basis for this diversity is the generally accepted view that domestic relations matters fall
normally within the bailiwick of the individual states. See, e.g. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) ("[R]egulation of domestic relations [is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the states.")
233. See Torma v. Torma, 645 P.2d 395, 399 (Mont. 1982).
234. Of course, any uniform legislation in this area can be no more effective in its overall
impact than the number of states that eventually adopt it. This has certainly been true of the
UMDA and its property division provisions.
235. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1214(b) (Supp. 1983); MD. Cm. & JUD. PRoc. CODE
ANN. § 3-6A-01(e) (1980); PA. STAT. ANN TIT. 23, § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236 Part (B)(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (2) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.54(5) (West. Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330(2) (Vernon Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(2) (Supp. 1982); and DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(B) (1974).
236. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2)(a-c) (1982 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1513(b)-(b) (3) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(a)(1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-201 (1975); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.190(2)-(2)(3) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 19,
§722-A(2)-2(e) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(5)(a)-(5)(e) (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.325(2)-(2)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1983);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 Part B(l)(d)(1)-B(l)(d)(4) (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
ARKANSAS MARITAL PROPERTY
and type of exclusions embodied in the numerous state statutes are va-
ried." 7 Hence, only those exceptions which have been most commonly
adopted will be discussed in this section of this article.
1. Gifts, Bequests, Inheritances, and Devises
The exception to the general marital property rule with respect to
inherited, gift, bequeath, and devised property acquired during the
marriage is perhaps the one most frequently mentioned in the state
statutes .23  Although the statutory provisions embodying this exception
tend to be rather straightforward and, hence, have not engendered
much controversy, courts situated in states which have not expressly
adopted the exception, or any exception for that matter, have been oc-
casionally constrained to fathom the treatment of a gift, bequest, inher-
itance, or devise under their equitable distribution of marital property
laws."' And it seems to be the common theme in these cases that the
disposition of this property-particularly gift or inherited-is deter-
mined by weighing the pertinent equitable distribution factors con-
tained in the apposite state statute with the view of achieving a fair and
50-20(b)(2) and (d) (Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 401(e)-(e) (7) (Purdon Supp. 1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981); and MD.
CT. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §3-6A-01 (1980). But see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-
81 (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-
11 (Burns 1980); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981). N.D. CENT. CODE §14-05-24 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105
(1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-4-5 (Supp. 1981);
WYo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1982), where no explicit allusion is made to an exception to the
marital property rules.
237. A good example of the striking differences which exist among some of these statutory
provisions is aptly illustrated by North Carolina's legislation (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 [Supp.
1981]) with its expansive, exclusionary provisions specifically encompassing peculiar items like
"professional and business licenses" and "vested pension and retirement benefits and expectations
of nonvested pensions or retirements" and Rhode Island's law (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1
(Supp. 1982) with its pithy provision ("property acquired before marriage or by inheritance are
not assignable by the court").
238. To this writer's knowledge, these states, in some form or another, have statutes which
embody the "gifts, bequests, inheritances, and/or devises" exception: Arkansas, Colorado, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas (but see Wachholz v. Wachholz, 603 P.2d 647 (Kan. App.
1970) gifts received during marriage are marital property despite KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-201 in
view of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 [d]), Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. For a case narrowly construing the
exception in regard to inherited property, see Sleeper v. Sleeper, 184 N.J. Super. 544, -, 446
A.2d 1220, 1222 (1982).
239. See, e.g., Cohm v. Cohm. 137 Vt. 487, 407 A.2d 184 (1979) (gift property: preference
was simply not to disturb separate property) and Lord v. Lord, 443 N.E. 2d 847 (Ind. App. 1982)




equitable division.24 0 Thus, the mere fact that the property is either a
gift or inheritance does not automatically warrant its exclusion from
the realm of marital property; rather, its source is simply a factor to be
considered with others in regard to dividing it.2 41 In short, the courts in
those states which have no explicit statutory provisions may, but are
not required to, divide gift or inherited property;242 the decision lies
within their broad discretion.
2. Valid Agreements of the Parties
An interesting feature of many marital property statutes is a pro-
vision which allows the marital partners to enter into an agreement to
exclude certain property acquired during the marriage from the realm
of marital property.2 48 As one commentator has observed, the parties to
the marriage can effectively opt out of a presumptive equal or equitable
distribution of marital property system by simply executing an agree-
ment (antenuptial or postnuptial) to that effect which is fair and rea-
sonable.244 Given this, the focal point of judicial analysis has invariably
been upon the validity of such agreements in screening out property
which would otherwise be marital property and, consequently, subject
to the distributive powers of the court. For instance, in In re Marriage
of Stokes,2 4 ' the parties to the marriage entered into an antenuptial
agreement which provided that all property owned before marriage or
acquired after marriage would be their respective separate property.
The husband's property escalated substantially in value during the
240. Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) (husband's contribution to farm inherited
by the wife was too meager to transmute it to marital property). But see Johnson v. Johnson, 300
N.W.2d 865 (S.D. 1980) (husband's significant contributions to the acquisition of the marital
home did not justify its characterization as a gift by the trial court; rather, home should have been
sold and the proceeds from the sale should have been equitably divided between the parties).
241. Cohm v. Cohm, supra note 239, at 184. (gift property); Andera v. Andera, 277 N.W.2d
725 (S.D. 1979); Torrey v. Torrey 206 Neb. 485, 293 N.W.2d 402 (1980); Craver v. Craver, 601
P.2d 999 (Wyo. 1979); Wachholz v. Wachholz, 603 P.2d 647 (Kan. App. 1979) (gifts during
marriage are marital property), subsequently followed by Redmond v. Redmond, 629 P.2d 142
(Kan. 1981); Herlitzke v. Herlitzke, 102 Wis.2d 490, 307 N.W. 2d 307 (Ct. App. 1981) (source
of property is an equitable distribution factor).
242. Lord v. Lord, 443 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 1983) (gift and inheritance property: separate
division was equitable, but not required). See also Wilson v. Wilson, 409 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. App.
1980).
243. Some states which have statutory provisions encompassing the valid agreements excep-
tion are: Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa (agreements are to be
considered, but are not binding), Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
244. DuCanto, supra note 87.
245. 42 Colo. App. 245, 608 P.2d 824 (1980).
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marriage; and the issue was whether this increase in value was ex-
cluded from the domain of marital property by the antenuptial agree-
ment. 24  The Colorado Court of Appeals held that an antenuptial
agreement which was valid according to ordinary contract principles 
47
could negate the statutory mandate that the increase in value of sepa-
rate property is marital property.24 8
Although validity, or lack thereof, has been a central issue in
many of the cases, the basic question as to whether there is actually an
agreement present has also surfaced in a few instances. In Hofmann v.
Hofmann,'" the Illinois Supreme Court wrestled with this very ques-
tion. In Hofmann, the husband and wife purchased a farm from the
husband's parents at reduced value. Although she was present at the
sale, the wife did not object to her name not being placed on the deed.
The issue broached by these facts was whether the wife had agreed
that the farm was to be the separate property of the husband by her
failure to object. The Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that the
wife's silence could not be construed as an agreement to surrender her
marital property rights in the farm. Thus, she was presumed to have
had a marital property interest in the farm since it was acquired during
the marriage.280
In a similar vein, the Missouri Court of Appeals, in Snider v.
Snider,25 1 held that the exclusion for valid agreements did not pertain
to a marital agreement to purchase stock because it was not grounded
upon an intent to alter marital property rights. 252 Thus, the stock re-
mained marital property, and the trial court did not err by ordering its
246. Unlike most equitable distribution states, Colorado denominates the increase in value
during the marriage of separate property as marital property. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
113(4) (1982 Supp.).
247. Quite interestingly, the court differentiated between separation agreements and ante-
nuptial agreements in terms of the test for determining validity. According to the court, the un-
conscionability standard of review which governs separation agreements does not apply to ante-
nuptial agreements. Instead, the validity of antenuptial agreements is ascertained in accordance
with the normal contract laws extant at the time the contract is made. See In re Marriage of
Stokes, 42 Colo. App. 245, 608 P.2d 824 (1980) and Newman v. Newman, __ Colo. -, 653
P.2d 728 (1982) (the common law subjects antenuptial agreements to fairness review for fraud,
overreaching, and concealment at the time when made).
248. In re Marriage of Stokes, 42 Colo. App. at - 608 P.2d at 828. See also In re Mar-
riage of Ingels, - Colo. App. -, 596 P.2d 1211 (1979).
249. 94 I1.2d 205, 446 N.E.2d 499 (1983).
250. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 502-03. The supreme court also distinguished Hofmann from
a prior decision, In re Marriage of Redden, 89 Ill. App.3d 1073, 412 N.E.2d 219 (1980), on the
basis that the farm property involved in Redden was the subject of an actual agreement between
the parties.
251. 570 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1978).
252. Id. at 773.
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equitable division between the parties.
In sum, the analytical framework for dealing with the "valid
agreements" exception to the marital property principle seems to in-
volve a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether there is an agreement, and
(2) whether it is valid. The resolution of these salient questions, as
usual, depends upon the peculiar facts of each case. Moreover, a court's
notion of fairness and equity in view of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances will undoubtedly play a major role in the factual
determination.
3. Property Acquired In Exchange for Property Acquired Prior to
Marriage
The exception to general marital property which encompasses
property obtained in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage
can engender some very complex statutory construction problems." As
a result, some courts have been constrained to engage in some rather
trenchant analysis to discern if the exception embraces the facts of a
given case. For instance, in Svetenko v. Svetenko,2" the husband
brought farm machinery into the marriage. However, during the mar-
riage, the parties obtained some newer farm machinery in exchange for
the premarital equipment. Rejecting the trial court's award to the hus-
band of all the farm machinery as his separate property, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that the farm machinery was marital
property, even though obtained in exchange for premarital property, to
the extent its value exceeded that of the premarital farm equipment.
In another interesting case, Tibbetts v. Tibbetts," the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine provided some illumination concerning the
precise contours of this exception by declaring that "it does not follow
that where a part of the property exchanged was non-marital, the en-
tire property acquired is, as a result, non-marital." 7 Elaborating fur-
253. Among the states whose marital property statutes embrace this exception are: (1) Ar-
kansas, (2) Delaware, (3) District of Columbia, (4) Illinois, (5) Kentucky, (6) Maine, (7) Minne-
sota, (8) Missouri, (9) New York, (10) North Carolina, (11) Pennsylvania, and (12) Wisconsin.
A number of these statutes also embody another distinct exception-property acquired in ex-
change for property acquired by gift, inheritance, devise, or descent. See. e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-1214(B)(2) (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(2)(a) (1982 Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.325(2)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(5)(c) (West Supp. 1983); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(B) (1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(a) (1981); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 236, Part B(d)(3) (McKinney 1977).
254. 306 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1981).
255. Id. at 611.
256. 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
257. Id. at 74.
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ther, the court reasoned:
Such property is non-marital to the extent that it was acquired in
exchange for property acquired prior to marriage. Thus a single item
of property may be to some extent non-marital and the remainder
marital. Accordingly, where property is acquired in exchange for both
marital property and non-marital property, the portion of the property
acquired in exchange for non-marital property must then be "set
apart" . . a
Upon achieving the appropriate separation of marital and non-marital
property, "the divorce court must then set apart the non-marital prop-
erty to each spouse and divide the marital property in an equitable
manner between them. '' 259 Commenting later upon Tibbetts, in Stevens
v. Stevens,' ° the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine provided further
elucidation upon this exchange-set aside procedure by noting: "Under
the tracing or source-of-funds theory recognized in Tibbetts, an ex-
change of a nonmarital interest for other property after marriage will
yield only a nonmarital interest proportionate in value in the newly ac-
quired property. 2 6 1
To be sure, other factual issues may also arise concerning this ex-
change exception to the rule of marital property. In all likelihood, how-
ever, the questions should be no more difficult than those involved in
the cases discussed above, for the process of tracing the non-marital
interest in the exchanged property into the newly acquired property
will generally be extremely troublesome.
4. Miscellaneous Exceptions to General Marital Property
Even the process of defining some lesser-known exceptions to gen-
eral marital property is a thorny undertaking. Specifically, this is the
258. Id. at 75 (emphasis added by the court).
259. Id. at 77. The methodology that the court formulates to accomplish the task "of sepa-
rating marital and non-marital property which has been conjoined in the acquisition of a single
property during marriage" is eclectic in that it is drawn from the UMDA, community property
court decisions, the ideas of legal commentators, and the Maine equitable distribution statute
itself. Id. at 75-77.
260. 448 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1982).
261. Id. at 1371. In Stevens, the husband inherited property before marriage as a joint ten-
ant with his mother and sister. After he married, title to the property was transferred to a
strawman, who, in turn, conveyed the property to the husband and wife. The court held that the
transfer of property to the husband and wife as joint tenants did not give the husband a larger
share than his original one-third inherited interest as separate property. In other words, tracing
the husband's separate property to ascertain what part of the newly acquired property was indeed
separate led only to that percentage of the property which he had obtained by intestate succession.
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case with respect to personal injury and workers' compensation awards
and settlements. A graphic illustration of the disagreement that can
arise in this regard is found in Mack v. Mack, 2 2 a decision of the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals. In Mack, the husband was involved in a
motorcycle accident during the marriage. A joint settlement was
reached in the neighborhood of $130,000.28 The court of appeals ruled
that the personal injury award was marital property, relying quite
heavily on the fact that the Wisconsin marital property statute did not
specifically exclude a personal injury settlement from the realm of mar-
ital property."" Although the settlement was held to be a marital asset,
the court departed from "the presumed equal division" rule under Wis-
consin marital property law and awarded the husband the larger share.
In explicating its reasons for upholding the trial court in this regard,
the court of appeals stated:
The court properly awarded a greater share of the settlement to
James in view of its source. Because of the continuing effect of the
injury to James, this is an appropriate case to alter the apportionment
from the presumed equal division.
The effect of receiving the greater part of the settlement is to increase
the amount of income that James will earn over his lifetime, an in-
crease not unbalanced by the pain, suffering, humiliation, and loss of
enjoyment of life suffered by James. It was also considered by the
court insofar as it increases the income available to James for pur-
poses of maintenance and support.""
Other courts have similarly held that a personal injury award was
a marital asset.2" But there is no consensus on the issue as evidenced
by the South Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Fink v. Fink.6 In a
slightly unusual fact situation where the husband was injured in an
explosion before the marriage and a settlement was reached after the
complaint for divorce was filed but before a divorce decree was issued,
262. 108 Wis.2d 604, 323 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1982).
263. Id. at -, 323 N.W.2d at 154. The court seemed to attach some significance to the fact
that the "lump sum settlement" was not only for the satisfaction of the husband's claim, but for
the wife's claims, if any, as well.
264. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981). The terms of the statute exclude those
assets which can be properly characterized as being a "gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Mack
v. Mack, 108 Wis.2d at _, 323 N.W.2d at 154-55.
265. Id. at -, 323 N.W.2d at 155.
266. See, e.g., Harmon v. Harmon, 391 A.2d 552, 553 (N.J. Sup. Ct. A.D. 1978) ("...the
settlement monies from plaintiff's motor vehicle accident occurring during the marriage is marital
property for distribution purposes. ); Heilman v. Heilman, 95 Mich. App. 728, 291 N.W.2d
183 (1980).
267. 296 N.W.2d 916 (S.D. 1980).
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the court ruled "that the settlement proceeds were not marital assets
subject to distribution." 6 8 Of especial significance is the fact that the
court went to great lengths to distinguish Fink from other cases which
had previously held that personal injury settlements were divisible mar-
ital assets.2 69 The basic distinctions drawn by the court were that the
cause of action in Fink "arose prior to the marriage" and that the set-
tlement monies were received a considerable time after the divorce
complaint was filed.270 It seems, quite frankly, that these factual dis-
tinctions probably do reconcile Fink with those cases which have
reached a contrary result.
In a similar vein, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Johnson,27 1 held that "a lump-sum award of workers' compensation re-
ceived by one of the spouses during the pendency of a divorce action
between them is marital property.127 2 The principal basis for the
court's decision was its perusal of the Kentucky marital property stat-
ute27 8 which reflected that a workers' compensation award was not enu-
merated as an exception to the general marital property rule.27'
In summary, the miscellaneous exceptions to marital property like
personal injury and workers' compensation awards and settlements
once again highlight the ambiguities that are inherent in virtually all
presumptive equal and equitable distribution of marital property
statutes.
V. THE ARKANSAS APPELLATE COURTS RESPOND TO
SOME KNOTTY PROBLEMS
A. Pensions
Surprisingly, neither the Arkansas Supreme Court nor the Arkan-
sas Court of Appeals has been inundated by a plethora of marital prop-
erty questions concerning pension benefits.2 75 But a few noteworthy
pension-related cases have been decided since the current marital prop-
erty statute was enacted in 1979.
268. Id. at 919.
269. Id. at 919.
270. Id. at 919.
271. 638 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1982).
272. Id. at 704.
273. Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1982).
274. Johnson v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d at 704.
275. It is difficult to rationalize the paucity of Arkansas cases which have focused upon the
pension benefits issue, although it is admittedly one of the most significant problems attendant to
the dissolution of a marriage.
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Paulsen v. Paulsen27 6 was the first pension case to arise subsequent
to the enactment of Act 705. It involved the issue of whether military
retirement pay was marital property subject to division upon divorce.
Focusing upon the "attributes" of property, the supreme court con-
cluded that military pensions do not vest, terminate upon the death of
the retiree, or have cash, surrender, or redemption value; hence they
cannot be logically described as "a fixed and tangible asset. 1178 In es-
sence, the court reasoned that military retirement pay was not property
and thus could not be divided pursuant to the marital property statute
at divorce. 7 Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, the supreme
court did temper slightly the effect of excluding military retirement pay
from the realm of marital property by holding that, while not marital
property, military retirement pay was an economic factor with respect
to alimony and child support determinations. 8 0
Notwithstanding the federal preemption turmoil spawned by Mc-
Carty v. McCarty8' and Congress' counteractive response via the Uni-
formed Services Former Spouses Protection Act,2 2 Paulsen has weath-
ered the storm unscathed. Indeed, it still appears to be an accurate
statement of Arkansas law.2 8
276. 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W. 2d 873 (1980).
277. Construing the predecessor legislation, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Repl. 1962), in
Feeney v. Feeney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
military retirement pay was not personal property capable of being distributed upon divorce. A
similar ruling was rendered later regarding railroad retirement benefits in Knopf v. Knopf, 264
Ark. 946, 576 S.W.2d 193 (1979).
278. Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 526, 601 S.W. 2d 873, 875 (1980).
279. Id. at 256, 601 S.W.3d at 875.
280. Id.
A similar approach was urged upon the supreme court in Day v. Day by Justice Hickman as
an alternative to the allocation between the parties to the marriage of the husband's pension rights
as marital property. Justice Hickman, citing Paulsen and other cases, stated:
If the property can be divided at divorce, it should be done at that point. . . .If it
appears inequities may result regarding either party, alimony is the answer. That has
been the answer of our courts and a good many other courts. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261,
270, 663 S.W.2d 719, 723 (1984).
In Day, the majority of the court felt that this was not an appropriate method for disposing of
the case because "an award of alimony and a division of marital property serve different pur-
poses." Id. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
281. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
282. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1450 (1982).
283. See Cochran v. Cochran, 7 Ark. Ct. App. 146, 644 S.W.2d 635 (1983) where the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principles of Paulsen.
But a cloud of uncertainty may now hang over the status of military pensions in Arkansas in
view of Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984). For example, in a scathing dissent,
Justice Hickman surmised that the extremely broad language appearing in the majority opinion
might very well "be applied to military pensions" and possibly undo earlier precedent which ex-
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Although the law in Arkansas concerning military retirement pay
vis-A-vis marital property seems rather clear, a far different situation is
extant with respect to civilian pension benefits. The first case in which
the supreme court has squarely addressed the question of civilian pen-
sions as a species of marital property is Bachman v. Bachman.2' " In
Bachman, the plaintiff husband was a physician who practiced
medicine in Russellville as a member of a professional medical associa-
tion. As a result, he participated in the association's profit sharing trust
and money-purchase pension plan. After the Bachmans failed to reach
an agreement as to the allocation of Dr. Bachman's interests in the
profit-sharing trust and pension plan, it was incumbent upon the Ar-
kansas courts to determine if they were distributable marital assets
upon marital dissolution. 85 Regarding the husband's interests in the
pension plan and profit sharing trust, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that they were marital property, and the wife was, therefore, enti-
tled to one-half of these interests. 8 6 Basically, the court reasoned that
since the husband's interests in the pension plan and profit sharing
trust had vested, had accumulated and were therefore ascertainable,
and were distributable to Dr. Bachman at the time of the divorce if he
had simply withdrawn from the professional association, they were in-
deed "a fixed and tangible asset" and thus property within the meaning
of the marital property division statute.28
At this point in its analysis, however, the court failed to provide
some much-needed direction concerning two other troublesome areas
which generally surface in regard to pensions in the context of marital
property: valuation and distribution.288 Instead, the supreme court re-
manded the case to the trial court with directions that it address these
cluded them from the rubric of marital property. Id. at 270, 663 S.W.2d at 723. But, until there is
a definitive court ruling which explicitly overrules Paulsen, its rationale should still be accepted as
good law.
For a more detailed discussion of Day v. Day, see notes infra, 286-322.
284. 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981).
285. The Yell County Chancery Court had previously held that the husband's interests in the
trust and pension plan was not marital property and, alternatively, even if they did constitute a
marital property interest, the wife was not entitled to share in the vested proceeds. Id. at 27, 621
S.W.2d at 703.
286. The supreme court rejected the wife's contention, however, that her one-half property
interest should extend beyond the date of the divorce, expressing the view that this might be
unfair and unduly disruptive of the professional association. Consequently, the wife's interest in
the trust and pension plan was measured up to the date of the divorce. Id. at 28, 621 S.W.2d at
704.
287. Id. at 28, 621 S.W.2d at 703.
288. For instance, a complex question concerning the divisibility of non-contributing pension
plans still awaits judicial determination.
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questions without the benefit of any carefully articulated guidance from
the state's highest court.2 ' Consequently, these two vital issues are
lacking any definitive guidelines from the supreme court; this is indubi-
tably a major flaw in the Bachman analysis.
Besides unresolved questions in regard to methods of valuation and
allocation of pension rights, it must be underscored that the pension
plan in Bachman was vested and unmatured. 90 Thus, the case did not
squarely address the status of nonvested pension benefits. Given the
language embodied in Bachman, however, it is transparent that the
vested nature of Dr. Bachman's pension291 benefits was an integral fac-
tor in the supreme court's reasoning.
The most recent, epochal marital property development in connec-
tion with pension benefits in Arkansas occurred in the case of Day v.
Day.2"2 In Day, the issue was whether the husband's interest in an em-
ployer-sponsored pension plan was marital property subject to division
at divorce.2 93 Briefly, the undisputed facts in Day were that the parties
had been married for a considerable period; during this time, six chil-
dren had been born of the marriage, with all but one having reached
majority at the time of the divorce. 94 The bone of contention at the
trial level and ultimately on appeal before the Arkansas Supreme
Court was the divisibility as marital property of the husband's interest
in the University of Arkansas' retirement plan.295 Of paramount inter-
est was the fact that the plan was described by the supreme court as
being "a combination of fixed and variable annuities, which cannot be
289. Id. at 28, 621 S.W.2d at 704.
290. Although Dr. Bachman did not have immediate access to the pension, it was immedi-
ately distributable to him at the time of divorce by withdrawing from the professional association.
But since this right of access was not unconditional, the pension interest must be classified as
being unmatured. See Note, supra note 105, at 181-182.
291. The emphasis on being "vested" as a prerequisite for being classified as property has
arisen more recently, albeit in slightly different contexts. In McMurtray v. McMurtray, 275 Ark.
303, 629 S.W.2d 285 (1982) the husband's interest in company stock was vested and fully distrib-
utable to him and was therefore marital property subject to equal division; however, in Hackett v.
Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W. 2d 560 (1982), the husband's capital account with his employer's
company was not shown to be vested nor fully distributable to him at the date of the divorce and
consequently was not marital property.
This view gained significant support recently in Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W. 2d 382
(1983), where the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[plroperty such as future retirement and
pension benefits is not marital property because it has not yet been acquired." The court cites
Paulson and Bachman in support of this proposition.
292. 281 Ark. 261; 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).
293. Id. at 263, 663 S.W.2d at 719.
294. Id. at 263, 663 S.W.2d at 720.
295. Id. at 264, 663 S.W.2d at 720.
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paid in a lump sum, have no loan value, and cannot be transferred."2
Under the traditional analysis which the Arkansas Supreme Court had
heretofore applied, the pension could have easily been characterized as
not being "a fixed and tangible asset" and hence not property under the
Arkansas marital property statute.9
But the Arkansas Supreme Court unexpectedly took a step in a
different direction from its previous position by candidly conceding that
it had "inadvertently failed to recognize the new concept of 'marital
property' created by Act 705 of 1979, as amended."29 8 In broad,
sweeping language, the court affirmed the chancery court's determina-
tion that the husband's interest in his pension plan was marital prop-
erty subject to division under the Arkansas marital property statute.299
The principal basis for this abrupt turnabout, if you will, was the
court's unfettered acceptance of the reasoning of In Re Marriage of
Brown, 00 where the California Supreme Court held that a "husband's
pension rights, a contingent interest, whether vested or not vested, com-
prise a property interest of the community and that the wife may prop-
erly share in it."3 01 Giving deference to Brown, the Arkansas Supreme
Court construed Act 705 broadly and concluded that marital property
means "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the mar-
riage, with exceptions a 2 not important" to the Day decision 803
Under this expansive analysis, the supreme court quoted exten-
sively from that section of the Brown decision where the California Su-
preme Court rejected earlier precedent304 and characterized a
nonvested pension right as property and not a mere expectancy.305 Iron-
ically, the wholesale adoption of this language might have been gratui-
tous because the court seemed to conclude that the pension rights in
Day were vested, in both the generally understood sense,30 and within
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980).
298. Day v. Day, supra note 292, at 265, 663 S.W.2d at 721.
299. Id. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
300. Id. at 266-67, 663 S.W.2d at 721-22.
301. In Re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, _, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, -, 544 P.2d 561,
570 (1976).
302. The exceptions to the marital property rule are found in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
1214(B) (1)-(5) (Supp. 1983).
303. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 265, 663 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1984).
304. French v. French, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
305. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 266-67, 663 S.W.2d 719, 721-22 (1984).
306. "Dr. Day's interest is vested in the sense that it cannot be diminished by the University
and is not dependent upon his continued employment there." Id. at 264, 663 S.W.2d at 720.
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the meaning of Brown;3o7 moreover, they appeared to be unmatured. 3°
If this were indeed a vested, unmatured pension plan, then it could
have been classified like the pension plans in Bachman, which were
held to be marital property under preexistent analysis.309
But the Arkansas Supreme Court did not so limit its holding in
Day. Instead, the court spurned any controlling distinction between
vested pension plans, either matured or unmatured, in determining
whether a pension plan is marital property subject to division upon
divorce.310
Moreover, the court underscored the fact that the husband's pen-
sion right was vested, yet openly embraced that language in the Brown
case which holds that it is inconsequential whether the pension benefit
is vested or nonvested, so long as it is acquired during the marriage. 11
For example, the court, attempting to limit its holding, stated:
What we do hold is simply that earnings or other property acquired
by each spouse must be treated as marital property, unless falling
within one of the statutory exceptions, and neither one can deprive the
other of any interest in such property by putting it temporarily be-
yond his or her own control, as by the purchase of annuities, partici-
pation in a retirement plan, or other device for postponing full enjoy-
ment of the property."1
How does Day affect Paulsen, Bachman, and their progeny? In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Hickman adopted the position that most, if
not all, of the prior court decisions adhering to the "traditional ap-
proach to marital property" were ostensibly overruled by Day.313 Is this
pure hyperbole? Perhaps it is. But if one parses the majority opinion,
its broad language is susceptible of an interpretation that answers some
previously unanswered questions and quite possibly changes the an-
swers to some questions which had previously been declared by the
307. "The court explained that it was construing a 'vested' pension right to be one that can-
not be unilaterally terminated by the employer without also terminating the employment relation-
ship. In that sense, Dr. Day's annuities are vested." Id. at 267, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
308. "Under the plan, Dr. Day cannot withdraw the funds standing to his credit, which have
no loan or surrender value, and cannot transfer his interest. He can, however, stop making contri-
butions at any time and began receiving his annuities." Id. at 264, 663 S.W.2d at 720.
309. See supra note 290.
310. One would think that these two types of pension plans were marital property under the
prior traditional property analysis. That is, since a vested, unmatured plan was marital property
under Bachman; surely, a vested matured plan would be marital property ("a fixed and tangible
asset") as well.
311. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 267, 663 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1984).
312. Id. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.




Regarding nonvested pension rights as marital property, the su-
preme court's unrestrained acceptance of the analysis in Brown engen-
ders thoughts that such retirement rights may now be viewed as contin-
gent interests in property and not mere expectancies. Clearly, this
implication does violence to dictum previously appearing in Potter v.
Potter 14 which was to the effect that a retirement plan vesting in the
future could not be characterized as marital property for the purposes
of division under the marital property statute. 15 And even though the
pension plan in Day was vested, the ultimate holding of the case seems
to transcend this limitation.3 16 According to Day, the determinative
factor was that the husband "used part of the family's money to buy
the annuities he now seeks to exempt from their proper classification as
marital property. 3 17 Apparently, this was sufficient to transform this
retirement plan into marital property, absent some recognized statutory
exception,31 8 whether it was vested or not.
Perhaps as important as Day's potential effect on the treatment of
nonvested pension benefits are the ramifications the decision may have
upon other pension benefits and similar entitlements that are acquired
during the marriage. The broad holding319 invites a vast amount of
speculation and conjecture as to its ultimate reach. As noted by Justice
Hickman, "insurance benefits with no cash or loan value", "social se-
curity benefits received by a person that is self-employed", and possibly
"military pensions" may now be marital property in view of the Day
rationale.320 As the majority conceded, and Justice Hickman pleaded,
Dr. Day's pension benefit had none of the indicia of "a fixed and tangi-
ble asset": "no cash value"; "no loan value"; and "could not be as-
signed or transferred."3 1 Yet, under the court's new "enlightened" def-
inition of the concept of marital property, these standards are
apparently no longer necessarily dispositive of the question.
In evaluating Day, one cannot ignore the court's blatant disregard
314. 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W.2d 382 (1983).
315. Id. at 46, 655 S.W.2d at 387.
316. Again, this is manifested in large measure by the deference accorded to In Re Marriage
of Brown, supra note 300.
317. Day v. Day, supra note 292, at 266, 663 S.W.2d at 721. (Emphasis added.)
318. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hickman emphasized that "[t]he mere fact that Mr.
Day contributed a small percentage of his monthly check into the plan during their marriage
should not convert it into marital property." Id. at 269, 663 S.W.2d at 723.
319. Id. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
320. Id. at 269-70, 663 S.W.2d at 723.




of established precedent with respect to pensions as marital property.
But it is totally refreshing and reassuring in a sense to see a court rec-
ognize that its prior analysis was flawed, thus necessitating a change in
direction. To this extent, the Day decision should be applauded.322 But
the decision doesn't resolve all the unanswered questions. To be sure, it
spawns uncertainty where there was none before-the military pension
situation is just an example." 3 To the extent, however, that the deci-
sion eliminates narrow, sometimes illogical, distinctions as the basis for
deciding whether a pension right is marital property, it is a progressive
step which is congruent with the partnership theory of marriage and
thus with the legislative intent underlying the Arkansas marital prop-
erty statute. 24
A glaring deficiency of Day, like Bachman, is the lack of guidance
with respect to valuation.3 25 Granted, valuation was not a troublesome
determination in the case because TIAA-CREF information on this
question was probably readily available.32 6 But the court, in looking
beyond Day, should have seized upon the opportunity to provide more
illumination on an extremely vital issue which could have been utilized
in more complex cases later on.
Although the Day decision is a highly significant addition to the
evolving pension/marital property jurisprudence in Arkansas, it is
probably not the ultimate judicial treatment of the issue. What it does
provide is a new platform, modeled after California,2 7 from which to
address the unanswered and uncertain questions that remain. 2 8
322. Only with the passage of time will it be known whether it was impolitic for the supreme
court to abandon precedent "in favor of a different approach used by California." Justice Hick-
man, in his dissenting opinion, viewed the court's action as being quite unreasonable. Id. at 270,
663 S.W.2d at 723.
323. Arkansas' stance on military pensions-they are nonmarital property-is perhaps con-
trary to the partnership theory of marriage. But a redeeming feature of the position is that it is
unambiguous. Day tends to cloud the issue.
324. See supra notes 74-81.
325. Regarding distribution, the supreme court basically endorses the allocation scheme de-
veloped by the chancellor. After determining that Dr. Day's TIAA-CREF pension plan had an
accumulated value of $95,425.03, the chancellor awarded half of that amount to Mrs. Day. How-
ever, Mrs. Day will begin to receive her portion of the annuities only when Dr. Day decides to
accept his pension benefits. As to any contributions to TIAA-CREF which Dr. Day may make
subsequent to the divorce decree, they shall inure "only to his benefit." See Day v. Day, 281 Ark.
261, 264, 663 S.W.2d 719, 720 (1984).
326. TIAA-CREF periodically provides such information to the participants in its annuity
programs to apprise them of the growth in value of their pension benefits. (See TIAA-CREF
Report of Annuity Premiums and Benefits).
327. See supra, notes 300-303.
328. In this writer's opinion, the Day decision offers a better hope of addressing these vague
and unanswered questions in a manner truly consistent with the concept of marital property as
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B. Treating the Marital Home Which is Owned as a Tenancy by the
Entirety
When the present Arkansas marital property law became effec-
tive,319 the question was broached as to whether this novel approach to
property division in Arkansas via the concept of presumptive equal divi-
sion of marital property3 ° encompassed property owned by the spouses
as tenants by the entirety. It is conceivable that some chancellors may
have thought that the new statute made them "horse traders" with re-
spect to all marital property, including that held in tenancy by the en-
tirety.3 1 The legitimacy of this reasoning, however, was mildly suspect
because there was a tenancy by the entirety statute already in place,33 2
which called for the equal division of entirety property. To be precise,
the statute provides that when the divorce decree is entered the tenancy
by the entirety estate dissolves automatically (unless otherwise provided
by the court) and becomes a tenancy in common, subject to apportion-
ment between the spouses as such. a
The issue created by juxtaposing the present marital property stat-
ute and the preexisting tenancy by the entirety statute was whether the
marital property statute superseded the older entirety statute, thereby
making entirety property divisible marital property under the marital
property statute. The issue reached eventually the Arkansas Supreme
envisioned by the Arkansas General Assembly.
329. 1979 Ark. Acts 705.
330. On some occasions, Arkansas has been designated as an equitable distribution of mari-
tal property state. See. e.g., 30 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 1 817 (1983). However, Arkansas'
marital property statute appears to create a presumption of an equal division of marital property
unless such a division would be inequitable. Then the court is empowered by the statute to equita-
bly divide the marital property in light of the ten equitable criteria listed therein. In sum, it is
slightly misleading to refer to Arkansas as an equitable distribution state per se; a preferable
designation would be presumptive equal distribution unless special factors militate against it; then
equitable distribution of the marital property becomes the rule.
331. But see the trial court's decision in Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 529 623 S.W.2d
813, 814 (1981).
332. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1215 (Supp. 1983).
333. Under the tenancy by the entirety statute, the court has only two options available with
respect to the disposition of this property: (1) it can order the property sold and divide the pro-
ceeds equally between the parties, or (2) it can place one of the spouses in possession of the
property until some future eventuality. However, the court cannot compel one spouse to convey his
or her interest in the property to the other. See Yancey v. Yancey, 234 Ark. 1046, 356 S.W.2d
649 (1962). See also Crabb v. Smith, -, Ark. App. ,.. 664 S.W.2d 510, 511 (1984) ("The
chancellor had the right to place the appellee in possession of the home, even for life."); Cantrell
v. Cantrell, - Ark. App. -, -, 664 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1984) ("the trial court may award the
possession of the homestead to either spouse, upon such terms as appear to be equitable and
just"); and Hada v. Hada, 10 Ark. App. 281, 283, 663 S.W.2d 203 (1984).
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Court3 " in Warren v. Warren,33 5 and the court held that tenancy by
entirety property was not marital property subject to division under the
marital property statute but was property which could only be divided
equally under the entirety statute.83 6 This principle has been reaffirmed
repeatedly in subsequent appellate court decisions.33 7 Thus, the marital
home which is owned as a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the
"horse trader" instincts of chancellors; rather, this property must be
divided equally between the parties. As to those marital homes which
the spouses do not own as tenants by the entirety, then the marital
property provisions of the general marital property statute probably do
apply.3
A potential problem may surface in connection with insuring that
a marital home held as a tenancy by the entirety will actually be di-
vided equally upon divorce. Perhaps the safest mechanism would be to
order that the property be sold and the proceeds divided equally be-
tween the parties.33 9 However, in some instances, especially in those
cases where minor children are involved, the chancellor has the alter-
nate prerogative of placing one of the spouses (generally the custodial
parent) "in possession of the premises." ' 40 The exercise of this option
may spur allegations by the spouse who is not awarded possession that
this arrangement will inevitably lead to an unequal division of the mar-
ital home. In fact, this issue came before the Arkansas Court of Ap-
334. In Ausburn v. Ausburn, 271 Ark. 330, 609 S.W.2d 14 (1980), the issue was untimely
raised for the first time on appeal; the supreme court rejected it and consequently upheld the
chancellor's equal division pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983).
335. 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981).
336. Id. at 816.
337. Bratcher v. Bratcher, 5 Ark. Ct. App. 250, 635 S.W.2d 278 (1982) (tenancy by the
entirety property is not marital property under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214); Wagh v. Wagh, 7
Ark. App. 122, 644 S.W.2d 630 (1983); Askins v. Askins, 5 Ark. Ct. App. 64, 632 S.W.2d 249
(1982) [the general marital property statute does not affect ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1215's appli-
cation to tenancy by the entirety property.]; and Warren v. Warren, 11 Ark. App. 58, 59, 665
S.W.2d 909, 910 (1984) ("[lt]his statute is the only authority for dividing estates by the entirety,
and it provides for the equal division of property without regard to gender or fault"). But see
Pinkston v. Pinkston, 278 Ark. 233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983) where the Supreme Court seems to
hold that a division of jointly held property was governed by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 and was
hence susceptible to an equal division unless demonstrable special circumstance justified "a depar-
ture from an equal division." This apparent inconsistency in the decisional law will be later dis-
cussed at notes infra 439-441.
338. See, e.g., Pinkston v. Pinkston, 278 Ark. 233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983) and Hada v.
Hada, supra note 333 at 284, 663 S.W.2d at 205, where the court of appeals noted that the
Warren holding pertains only to "entirety property."
339. This option's availability was recently reaffirmed by the court of appeals in Wagh v.
Wagh, 7 Ark. Ct. App. 122, 644 S.W.2d 630, 631 (1983).
340. Id.
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peals in Bramlett v. Bramlett.34 1 In Bramlett, the wife was awarded
possession of the marital home along with custody of the parties' minor
children. Moreover, the husband was required to continue to make
mortgage payments on the house, to pay taxes, and to make child sup-
port payments. The husband argued that it was necessary for the court
to fix his equity in the house as of the date the divorce decree was
entered and to give him credit for one-half of his mortgage payments in
order that there would be an equal division of the house. Otherwise, he
contended, the wife's interest in the house would steadily appreciate as
he continued to make the mortgage payments, leading to the unpalat-
able situation of an unequal division of the property upon its ultimate
sale.34'2 The court of appeals listened to the husband's contentions with
an unsympathetic ear, basically holding that with respect to tenancy by
the entirety property (the marital home) the trial court was not re-
quired to fix the husband's equity upon divorce.3 43 In addition, the
court held that it was not erroneous to refuse to award "the husband
credit for one-half of the mortgage payments where the court consid-
ered" them in formulating the child support obligations. 44 Under these
circumstances, the trial court had not transgressed the statutory re-
quirement that there be an equal division of property owned as a ten-
ancy by the entirety.
Interestingly, the law in Arkansas in regard to distributing the
marital home at divorce seems to be fairly settled. The incisive analysis
of the Arkansas appellate courts is largely responsible. 45
C. Defining the Exceptions to General Marital Property
The Arkansas marital property statute encompasses several excep-
tions to the principle that "'marital property' means all property ac-
quired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage." 31 4 A number of
these exceptions have yet to be judicially interpreted by either the Ar-
341. 5 Ark. Ct. App. 217, 636 S.W.2d 294 (1982).
342. Id. at 219, 636 S.W.2d at 295.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 220, 636 S.W.2d at 295.
345. But see Pinkston v. Pinkston, infra notes 446-448, for a discussion of a potential source
of uncertainty that may have developed in this area.
346. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B) (Supp. 1983). The enumerated exceptions to the Ar-
kansas marital property law are: "(1) [P]roperty acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2)
[P]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage or in exchange for prop-
erty acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) [Plroperty acquired by a spouse after a
decree of divorcefrom bed and board; (4) [P]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
and (5) [t]he increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage."
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kansas Supreme Court or the Arkansas Court of Appeals. For instance,
there are no appellate decisions squarely construing the marital prop-
erty exceptions regarding (1) property acquired in exchange for pre-
marital property, (2) property acquired while a decree of divorce from
bed and board is in effect, and (3) the increase in value of premarital
property.3 47
There have been, however, some judicial rulings-some instructive
and some not-where either the Arkansas Supreme Court or the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals has placed an interpretative gloss upon some
of the enumerated exceptions to the law of marital property. An evalu-
ation of these sparse, but rather significant, decisions is now in order.
1. The Gift, Bequest, Devise or Descent Exception
The marital property statute expressly excludes from the marital
"kitty" that property which is obtained by virtue of either a gift, be-
quest, devise, or which has devolved to an individual by descent.3 8 In
reviewing the few Arkansas appellate decisions construing this excep-
tion, one discerns that the courts have interpreted it in a rather
straightforward fashion. For example, in Chrestman v. Chrestman,40
the Arkansas Court of Appeals reasoned that since the statute ex-
empted property acquired by "bequest, devise or descent," then it was
permissible for the lower court to conclude that the property whose sta-
tus was being disputed was not marital property subject to division
upon divorce. 50
In another decision, Hayse v. Hayse, 51 the court of appeals faced
a more complex set of facts. The wife had inherited $20,000 in money
market certificates; she later placed the money in a certificate of de-
posit in the names of both spouses.,3 2 Because the $20,000 was inher-
ited by the wife, according to the court, it would be treated as non-
marital property and not be subject to equal division under the marital
property statute unless the wife had somehow created a gift interest in
347. Of those untouched areas, probably the most intricate and troublesome is evaluating
"the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage." There has also been no judicial
activity with respect to the two exceptions concerning property acquired in exchange for exempt
property.
348. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(1) (Supp. 1983).
349. 4 Ark. Ct. App. 281, 630 S.W.2d 60 (1982).
350. Id. at 283, 630 S.W.2d at 62. The operative effect of the court of appeals' decision was
that the appellant spouse was not entitled to any portion of the property because it was not a
product of the marriage and thus could not be placed under the rubric of marital property.
351. 4 Ark. Ct. App. 160-B, 630 S.W.2d 48 (1982).
352. Id. at 160-D, 630 S.W.2d at 48.
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her husband when she purchased the certificate of deposit.3 53 The court
concluded, however, that this act alone did not manifest the donative
intent necessary to constitute a gift;8k hence, the property maintained
its non-marital quality and was not divisible.
In summary, it appears that the gift, bequest, devise or descent
exception has been and will probably continue to be narrowly con-
strued. The court of appeals has certainly demonstrated its predisposi-
tion to interpret this statutory exception in this manner, which will
likely make it exceedingly difficult to show that it does not pertain to
the facts of a particular case when the issue arises. Moreover, this
mode of analysis seems to mirror the supreme court's position as well.
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,3 55 the court held that inherited property be-
longed to and had to be returned to the spouse who inherited it. Once
again, the contention that a gift interest had been created in the other
spouse which negated the non-marital character of the property was
rejected. 56 And in Potter v. Potter,35 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that a piano which the husband and children purchased for the
wife was a gift, taking it outside the realm of marital property.
353. Id. at 160-E, 630 S.W.2d at 49. The court of appeals was essentially looking for some-
thing which indicated that the wife had extinguished the "non-marital" status of the inherited
property by creating a gift interest in favor of the husband.
354. Id. at 160-F, 630 S.W.2d at 49-50.
355. 278 Ark. 619, 648 S.W.2d 51 (1983).
356. Id. at 621, 648 S.W.2d at 52. But see Gorchik v. Gorchik, - Ark. App. - 663
S.W.2d 941 (1984), where the Arkansas Court of Appeals, applying the Hayse analysis, ruled
that a husband's inheritance ($5,000) was transformed to marital property status when he "placed
the money voluntarily in a joint account which both parties utilized during the course of their
marriage." Id. at -, 663 S.W.2d at 943. In other words, the court of appeals concluded that the
aforementioned facts evinced that the husband had created an interest in the inheritance in favor
of the wife, thereby negating "its status as non-marital property."
However, in Bell v. Bell, - Ark. -, 666 S.W.2d 708, 709 (1984), the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruled that "the conveyance of the home from" the husband to the wife "did not constitute a
gift" and that the home retained its marital property status, making it subject to equal division
between the parties to the marriage at divorce. In explaining its unwillingness to be bound by the
apparent conveyance of the home by quitclaim deed, the supreme court noted:
The quitclaim deed was not a gift from appellee to appellant but a device by both
parties to ensure that appellee's former wife and children would have no claim on the
property. Under the circumstances of this case, where during the marriage, both parties
considered the home as joint property, we cannot say the chancellor's finding was
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, according to the court, the facts did not reflect the requisite "intent to make a gift."
357. 280 Ark. 38, 44-45, 655 S.W.2d 382, 386 (1983). A dissimilar position was taken in
Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 499, 500, 659 S.W.2d 510, 511 (1983) where the court held
that the facts did not evidence that a transaction involving 30 acres of land was a gift. Thus, the
acreage was deemed to be marital property.
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2. Property Excluded by Valid Agreement of the Parties
An interesting feature of marital property division statutes is a
provision that allows the spouses to opt out, totally or partially, from
the realm of marital property by simply entering into a valid agreement
to this effect.3" In fact, one noted family law commentator has opined
that the parties can by way of an antenuptial or postnuptial agreement,
which is reasonable and fair, exclude any property from the ambit of
marital property. 6
The Arkansas Court of Appeals has considered the "valid agree-
ment" exception twice in connection with reconciliation agreements. In
Schichtel v. Schichtel, 60 the court initially recognized the validity of
reconciliation agreements as an exception to the Arkansas marital
property law.8 "' Nevertheless, the court held that the provisions of the
reconciliation agreement which was before it did not actually exclude
the subject property from the realm of marital property."'2 The fatal
deficiency of the agreement was that it reserved to the trial court the
power to alter or modify its provisions, thus placing in serious question
the parties' intent to irrevocably exclude that property from the marital
property domain."'
In a later case, Smith v. Smith,8" the court of appeals reaffirmed
its earlier pronouncement in Schichtel as to the validity of reconcilia-
tion agreements as an exception to Arkansas' marital property law.
However, Smith differed dramatically from Schichtel in that its facts
did reflect a "valid agreement."9 65
Beyond reconciliation agreements, the Arkansas appellate courts
have not been afforded an opportunity to decide what other compacts
come within the pale of the "valid agreement" exception. There is no
readily apparent reason why postnuptial agreements which avoid the
fatal shortcomings of the reconciliation agreement in Schichtel cannot
358. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(4) (Supp. 1983). See also UMDA § 306.
359. DuCanto, supra note 87. In connection with the validity of antenuptial agreements in
excluding property from the rubric of marital property, there is some ambiguity because ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 55-309 (Cum. Supp. 1983), the relatively new antenuptial agreement statute, may
be read to foreclose the utility of antenuptial agreements in this regard.
360. 3 Ark. Ct. App. 36, 621 S.W.2d 504 (1981).
361. Id. at 38, 621 S.W.2d at 506.
362. Id. at 41, 621 S.W.2d at 507-08.
363. Id. at 38, 621 S.W.2d at 506.
364. 6 Ark. Ct. App. 252, 640 S.W.2d 458 (1982).
365. Id. at 255, 640 S.W.2d at 460. The court of appeals noted the absence of any evidence
"that the property was to belong to appellee if the reconciliation was successful or that there was
an agreement that appellant would regain any interest in the property at any time."
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effectively exclude property from marital property treatment. However,
the chief uncertainty with respect to this exception is whether it encom-
passes antenuptial agreements in view of the equivocal language em-
bodied in the Arkansas antenuptial agreement statute. 6 Further un-
certainty and future litigation are probable consequences of this
awkwardly drafted statute.
It is evident that both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals have not provided meaningful guidance in a
number of the troublesome areas inherent in a presumptive equal/equi-
table distribution of marital property jurisdiction like Arkansas. In all
fairness to both courts, however, many of these issues have not yet
come before them;367 this is probably due to the fact that the Arkansas
marital property statute is still a relatively recent addition to Arkansas
jurisprudence.86 8 In future years, one can simply hope that more defini-
tive answers will flow from the Arkansas appellate courts.
D. The Homemaker's Services
In what has to be recognized as an epochal development, the Ar-
kansas marital property statute-like many of its counterparts in other
statess 9 -considers "homemaking as a contribution to the assets of
marriage in determining property division. ' 70 Under the presumptive
equal division scheme embodied in the Arkansas statute, the home-
maker services criterion can be a touchstone in fashioning an equitable
distribution when the court concludes that an equal division will be
inequitable.3 71
366. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-309 (Supp. 1983) and supra note 359.
367. See supra note 385.
368. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983) was, as noted earlier, initially enacted in
1979.
369. See, Freed and Foster, supra note 42, at 246 for a listing of these states.
370. Note, supra note 2 at 679 n.46. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1)(8) (Supp.
1983). ["contributions of each party in acquisition, preservation or appreciation of marital prop-
erty including services as a homemaker" (emphasis added)]. This statutory provision has been
applauded for placing the homemaker's contribution on the same plane as the breadwinner's
financial contributions. See, Note, supra note 2 at 688.
371. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1)(8) (Supp. 1983). Although in the vast number
of cases, the wife and the husband will be the homemaker and breadwinner, respectively, the roles
may be reversed in some instances. See, e.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 280 Ark. 546, 660 S.W.2d 162
(1983). In Stuart, the supreme court spurned the wife's contention that it was "inequitable to
divide the property equally when her earnings formed the greater part of the purchase price." Id.
at 548, 660 S.W.2d at 163. And in Day v. Day, supra note 292 at 264, 663 S.W.2d at 721, the
Arkansas Supreme Court once again acknowledged the importance of the services of a home-
maker in making a division of marital property incident to divorce. Later in its opinion, the court
specifically referred to the Day facts and stated:
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To date, Arkansas' appellate courts have not been confronted with
a deluge of cases broaching the homemaker services issue.3 72 Yet, a
couple of decisions do deserve some discussion because they provide
some guidance as to how this equitable distribution factor will likely be
weighed by the courts. In Ford v. Ford,37 3 the Arkansas Supreme
Court had to decide837  whether a distribution of the marital personal
property of the parties-other than property held in tenancy in com-
mon-in the amount of 90% to the husband and 10% to the wife
squared with the Arkansas marital property division statute in view of
the attendant facts and circumstances of the case.
In Ford, the determinative factor seemed to be that, for the last 5
years of the marriage, Mrs. Ford had been virtually nonfunctional
due to acute mental health problems; as a result, she had contributed
very little to the marriage, including meager homemaker services 7 5 In
contrast, Mr. Ford was an industrious, resourceful farmer who made
substantial monetary contributions toward the acquisition of $300,000
in personal property for the family, the division of which was at issue in
the case.
It seems indisputable that the 90/10 split of the personal property
in favor of the husband in Ford was deemed to be equitable because of
the vast disparity that existed in the respective contributions to the
marriage of the husband and wife. The wife's miniscule contributions
to the farming operations and as a homemaker were undoubtedly con-
sidered by the court in a negative vein and were largely the underlying
reason why the 90/10 property split was upheld as a permissible equi-
table distribution of marital property.
A strikingly different result was in evidence later in Bachman v.
[W]e must recognize that Mrs. Day also contributed to the acquisition of the annuities
by service as a homemaker and by bearing the six children and bringing them up.
372. Id. One can only speculate why only a small number of cases embracing the home-
maker's question have reached the Arkansas appellate courts. Here again, it is this writer's opin-
ion that this is another classic example of what can happen during the early states of development
of a statute which radically departs from the pre-existing law. Thus, the plenary resolution of each
and every issue under the marital property statute may be gradual and could possibly take a long
period of time.
373. 272 Ark. 506, 616 S.W.2d 3 (1981).
374. The supreme court also decided in Ford that, when a divorce decree is entered, the
court must either allow or disallow alimony at that time. It is erroneous for a court to defer its
ruling until some time in the future when there may be a change in circumstances. Id. at 517, 616
S.W.2d at 9.
375. Id. at 511, 616 S.W.2d at 6. The evidence reflected that Mrs. Ford spent much of the 5
-year period just sitting in a rocking chair while in a severe state of depression. As a result, the
husband contended that she was not a "good homemaker." Id.
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Bachman-'" As previously noted,8 77 the primary issue in Bachman was
the divisibility as marital property of the husband's interests in a profit
sharing trust and money purchase pension plan. Of course, the supreme
court ruled that they were divisible marital assets.8 78 But perhaps a
more important aspect of the case is the weight that the court gave to
the homemaker services equitable criterion in deciding the wife's per-
centage of the trust agreement and pension plan.
In Bachman, the court conceded that the property (trust and pen-
sion plan) was a product of the husband's labors.37  Nevertheless, the
court observed: "he wanted her to remain in the home. She turned
down employment because of his desire that she be a homemaker and
active in the community. Her services as a homemaker are to be taken
into consideration in determining the contribution of each party."80
Applying this reasoning, the supreme court held that the wife was
entitled to a one-half interest in the trust agreement and pension
plan,881 indicating once again the willingness of the court to factor in
the homemaker's services and contributions in reaching an equitable
distribution of the marital property. There were significant homemaker
and community contributions made by Mrs. Bachman and hence a
more favorable result ensued from the wife's perspective than in Ford.
Commenting upon the effect of the Ford and Bachman decisions, a
writer has made this observation: "The decisions indicate that the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has recognized the statute's major innovation: in
Arkansas marriages, the wife's homemaking contribution is now equal
to the husband's financial contributions."'
Although the decisions undoubtedly demonstrate that a court can
and sometimes will value the nonmonetary contributions of a home-
maker on a par with the financial contributions of the breadwinner, it is
376. 274 Ark., 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981).
377. See supra notes 284-291.
378. 274 Ark. 23, 27, 621 S.W.2d 701, 703 (1981).
379. Id. at 28, 621 S.W.2d at 704.
380. Id. (emphasis added).
381. Here again, it deserves mention that the court cut off the wife's marital property inter-
est as of the date of the divorce. Id.
382. Note, supra note 2, at 688. Perhaps the commentator's assessment of the supreme court
is accurate. See, e.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 280 Ark. 546, 548, 660 S.W.2d 162, 163. But see Forsgren
v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. Ct. App. 286, 288, 630 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1982) where the court of appeals
upheld an unequal division of stock on the basis that it had been acquired solely by the efforts,
contributions, and contacts of the husband; and the "wife contributed nothing to the acquisition of
the stock, except her efforts as a homemaker," (emphasis added). Query: Is the court of appeals




unclear whether the court supplied any test or mechanism for valuing
the homemaker's services for use in future cases. In neither decision is
there a meaningful discussion of the calculus for determining how
much the homemaker's services are worth in dollars and cents.383 This
is especially grating in Ford where Mrs. Ford's failure as a "contribut-
ing partner" caused her to not only lose an equal share, but to be rele-
gated to a position where she was only awarded 10% of the personal
marital assets other than tenancy in common property.' What valua-
tion methodology concerning homemaker services did the court utilize
to reduce her presumptive 50% share so drastically? It is not readily
apparent from the decision. 85 And this is a major deficiency, for the
reasonably precise valuation of the homemaker's services and contribu-
tions is a profoundly important judicial undertaking.
E. The Increase in Value of Separate Property
One of the many exceptions to the Arkansas marital property law
relates to the increase in value during the marriage of property ac-
quired before marriage. Under the Arkansas statute, this increment is
classified as separate property 8s6 and is normally not divisible between
the spouses at divorce.387
To date, neither Arkansas appellate court has clearly defined the
precise contours of this marital property exception. In fact, the closest
issue yet to arise simply focused upon a spouse's right to recompense
for improvements made upon the separate property of the other spouse.
In Callaway v. Callaway, 88 the Arkansas Court of Appeals awarded
the husband one-half of the value of improvements which he made on
some real property which was acquired by the wife prior to the mar-
383. In Bachman, for example, the supreme court basically concluded that the wife's contri-
butions were equal to one-half the value of the profit sharing trust and money purchase pension
plan which amount was not in the record. The court remanded the matter to the trial court for its
determination of the monetary amount. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 28, 621 S.W.3d 701,
704. In a recent case addressing the homemaker services criterion, Stuart v. Stuart, 280 Ark. 546,
660 S.W.2d 162, the Arkansas Supreme Court once again failed to shed any light on the valuation
question.
384. Note, supra note 2, at 688.
385. It appears that the supreme court relied heavily upon the reasoning and calculations of
the chancellor. Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 516-17, 616 S.W.2d 3, 8. But these computations
seem to be a poor substitute for the precision necessitated by such an intricate, vital
determination.
386. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(5) (Supp. 1983).
387. But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Supp. 1983) where the trial court is given
discretionary authority to apportion separate property under special circumstances.
388. 8 Ark. Ct. App. 129, 648 S.W.2d 520 (1983).
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riage s89 In regard to the property, the court reasoned that "a spouse is
entitled to improvements if the spouse claiming them can show he
helped make them."1 Furthermore, the court concluded that in Cal-
laway "the improvements were made with marital property;" 91 this
undoubtedly bolstered the husband's claim to a portion of them.892
Although the analysis of Callaway does not directly fall within the
parameters of the increase in value of separate property exception, it
may portend the approach that the court of appeals and perhaps the
supreme court will employ in the future when they must actually de-
cide whether the exception applies to the facts of a particular case.
Because an "improvements" reimbursement case like Callaway is not
dramatically different in its theoretical approach, the appellate courts
may be loath not to equally apportion between the spouses those in-
creases in value of property acquired before marriage which are unde-
niably attributable to some marital assets, provided the equal division is
not deemed to be inequitable. The courts may very well decide that the
exception does not apply in such a case, and thus, the increased value is
in fact marital property; or they may hold that, although it is separate
property, special circumstances nevertheless warrant the court's divi-
sion of the property. 9 Here again, the definitive resolution of this
question must await future litigation.
VI. WHAT'S AHEAD FOR ARKANSAS IN REGARD TO
MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION?-A REPRISE OF SOME
UNANSWERED AND PARTIALLY ANSWERED QUESTIONS
AND A PROGNOSTICATION OF POSSIBLE THINGS TO
COME.
A. Pensions
Despite the Arkansas Supreme Court's pronouncements in Bach-
man v. Bachman394 and, most recently, in Day v. Day,3 95 the issue of
389. Id. at 134, 648 S.W.2d at 523.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. The court of appeals noted that the only circumstance which would preclude a spouse
from recouping one-half of his improvements is one demonstrating that an equal division would be
inequitable. Id.
393. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Supp. 1983) which does seem to allow the
court to affect property outside the marital property estate in view of the stated equitable criteria
in the statute. See also Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 76, 655 S.W.2d 398, 401 (1983)
(". . .the chancellor is given broad powers under § 34-1214 to distribute all property in divorce,
nonmarital as well as marital, to achieve an equitable division").
394. Supra note 284.
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pension benefits in the context of division of marital property upon di-
vorce still remains somewhat unsettled. 896 In retrospect, Bachman may
have left more questions unresolved than it actually answered. A valid
criticism of Bachman is that it may have been too narrowly decided.397
Only vested, unmatured pension rights are specifically encompassed by
the court's holding.3 98 To be sure, other pension rights quite conceiva-
bly may not have been affected.
Perhaps some of the shortcomings of Bachman have been assuaged
by the Day decision. For instance, the court's unqualified endorsement
of the reasoning of In Re Marriage of Brown, albeit ostensibly super-
fluous to the determination of the marital property question in Day,
395. Supra note 292. The rationale in Day was recently adhered to in Gentry v. Gentry, -
Ark. _, 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984), wherein the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a husband's
civil service pension plan, which had vested and from which "the husband was actually receiving
benefits at the time of the divorce," was marital property. The court emphasized that "all require-
ments for receiving benefits, required years of service and contributions, occurred during the mar-
riage." Hence, in the opinion of the court, these retirement benefits had been acquired during the
marriage. It deserves comment that the Arkansas Supreme Court in Gentry, as in Day v. Day,
attempted to disavow any intention to establish any "rigid and inflexible rule for the future" by
classifying Gentry's retirement benefits as marital property. Here again, the court reiterated that
a vast amount of discretion lay in the hands of each chancellor to decide whether or not an equal
division of retirement benefits was indeed equitable. But see Bagwell v. Bagwell, - Ark. _ 668
S.W.2d 949 (1984), where the supreme court again echoed the view that Section 34-1214, the
Arkansas marital property division statute, "does not dictate an inflexible rule; rather it allows
latitude for the exercise of the Chancellor's best judgment in complying with the statute." Never-
theless, the court decided in Bagwell that the chancellor had erred in dividing the property be-
tween the parties to the marriage. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hays relied upon the earlier
court decisions which had espoused the view that broad discretion is granted to the chancellor to
equitably divide property incident to divorce; in view of this principle, Justice Hays could find no
"compelling reason" for the Arkansas Supreme Court to modify the chancellor's division of the
property. But the majority of the court did view the property division by the chancellor as being
"clearly against the preponderance of the evidence" and thus reversible.
396. In stark contrast, the military pension benefits issue seems to have been definitively
resolved in Paulsen v. Paulsen, supra note 267.
But some uncertainty may have crept into this area again with the advent of Day v. Day. See
supra notes 292-328 for a discussion of the potential effects of Day on marital property distribu-
tion law in Arkansas.
397. Making narrow decisions has always been a palpable feature of the American judicial
process. Even the United States Supreme Court has occasionally managed to avoid issues by fash-
ioning a very limited holding. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
The most commonly stated explication for this practice is that a court is only obligated to decide
those issues which are before it; hence, collateral issues have to await resolution at some future
time.
398. As noted earlier, the redeeming features of the pension plan in Bachman were that (1)
it was vested; (2) it had accumulated and was, therefore, ascertainable; and (3) it was immedi-
ately distributable to the holder of the rights on the date of the divorce by his withdrawing from
the professional association. Undoubtedly, vested, matured pension rights qualify as marital prop-
erty interests under the Bachman analysis as well. See Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W.2d
382 (1984).
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represents a powerful declaration in support of the notion that all pen-
sions arising out of the marriage-vested and nonvested, matured and
unmatured-are recognizable property rights subject to distribution,
provided they do not fall within an enumerated exception to the Arkan-
sas marital property statute. 99
This holding is potentially far-reaching in terms of expanding the
species of pension benefits that may be included with the pale of mari-
tal property.400 But, as explicitly observed in Day, the Arkansas marital
property statute still reposes a large amount of discretion in the chan-
cellor because "it provides that all marital property shall be divided
equally 'unless the court finds a division to be inequitable.'-401
Again, a negative aspect of Day is its rather superficial treatment
of the generally complex issue of the valuation of pension rights which
are found to be divisible marital property.402 Unlike Bachman, where
the Arkansas Supreme Court chose apparently to shrug off the issue
and delegated the responsibility of determining the value of Dr. Bach-
man's pension benefits to the chancery court,403 the court did ascertain
the value of Dr. Day's pension.4 " But, in Day, this determination prob-
ably did not require great insight.4"0 More importantly, the court failed
to articulate any standards that might serve as a polestar in future
cases.40 6 Thus, in both Bachman and Day, no significant light was shed
on this vital subject.407
399. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1983), for an enumeration of the
exceptions to the law of marital property in Arkansas.
400. As noted earlier, social security benefits and military pensions, just to name a few, may
be encompassed within the Day rationale. See supra, note 292.
401. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
402. The intricacy of the problem is graphically illustrated by commentators who suggest
that it may be prudent to procure the services of an accountant or an actuary when trying to
assign a present value to a pension right which will likely be realized some time in the future. See
H. Clark, Cases and Problems on Domestic Relations, 908 (3d ed. 1980). See also supra note
101.
But see Troyan, Pension Evaluation and Equitable Distribution, 10 Fain. L. Rep. 3001, 3015
(1983), where the commentator concludes, after a fairly detailed discussion, that "[p]ension valu-
ation can be simple, impartial and inexpensive."
403. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. at 28, 625 S.W.2d at 705.
404. Apparently relying upon evidence emanating from the trial court, the court makes the
conclusional statement that "[t]he accumulated value of his interest in the plan was $95,425.03."
No further insight is provided.
405. As noted earlier, TIAA-CREF can easily provide this information. See supra, note 326.
406. This shortsightedness is a major deficiency of Bachman and Day.
407. One possible explanation for the supreme court's apathetic treatment of the valuation
question in Bachman is that it may not have been perceived as being an extremely complex issue
under the facts of the case. The pension rights were vested, ascertainable, and distributable to the
husband at the time of the divorce. Thus, the trial court could easily determine how much in
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In a simple case, perhaps this lack of detailed guidance is not criti-
cal. But an entirely different matter is presented when, for example,
there is a vested pension right which will not mature until several years
in the future. The court is then generally placed into the unenviable
position of having to determine, with some reasonable degree of preci-
sion, the present value of a future benefit.408 As noted earlier,40 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bloomer v. Bloomer 10 adopted an analyt-
ical approach that seems best suited for resolving the involved issues of
valuation and distribution. Bloomer's three-option approach41' provides
some broad discernment for handling a variety of pension benefit valua-
tion and allocation problems. The Arkansas Supreme Court should
closely examine the Bloomer standards when the next marital property
pension case is before it.412
On balance, Day is a very progressive decision in regard to the
marital property treatment of civilian pensions. It is not the panacea,
however; there are still some challenging questions which have not been
satisfactorily addressed.413 Yet, it is difficult to entirely comprehend the
basis of Justice Hickman's statement in his dissenting opinion where he
castigates the majority decision by declaring that it "can only lead to
more confusion, uncertainty and perhaps, in many cases, less equitable
decisions. 41 4 Undoubtedly, this may be correct in some instances.415
But this is a small price to pay for a theory of marital property that
truly vindicates the partnership theory of marriage in connection with
pension benefits.
pension benefits had accumulated at the time of divorce (the court explicitly refused to award the
wife a greater interest) and then allocate equal shares to the parties. And in view of the fact that
information concerning the accumulated value of Dr. Day's annuity was readily ascertainable
from TIAA-CREF, the valuation question in Day may have been even simpler.
408. A number of courts have approached this task with apprehension. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 105, at 175, for a detailed discussion of the valuation problem.
409. See supra notes 117-126.
410. Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis.2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978).
411. See supra notes 117-126, for a discussion of these alternative methods of valuation and
distribution.
412. See also Note, supra note 105, at 175, for some good guidance.
413. As noted previously, Day provides very little, if any, illumination on the generally so-
phisticated issues of valuation and distribution of pension benefits. Beyond interests in pension
plans, it provides nothing but an opportunity to speculate as to the possible treatments of a profes-
sional degree, license, or enhanced future earning capacity and of professional goodwill in the
context of the Arkansas marital property statute. Moreover, some credence must be given to Jus-
tice Hickman's contention that Day may obfuscate issues such as the marital property status of
military pensions and other entitlements acquired with family funds during the marriage.
414. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. at 269, 663 S.W.2d at 723.
415. See supra, note 413.
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B. Professional Degrees and Licenses
To date, the issue of whether a professional degree, license, or in-
creased earning capacity is divisible marital property under the Arkan-
sas marital property statute has not been addressed by either the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court or the Arkansas Court of Appeals."1 One can,
therefore, only surmise as to the eventual outcome once the issue is
presented.
Undoubtedly, the central inquiry of the Arkansas appellate courts
will be whether either a professional degree, license, or enhanced earn-
ing capacity is "property." Currently, the apparent benchmark in Ar-
kansas for making this determination emanates from the previously de-
cided military and civilian pension cases. 17 Given this, the focus will
likely be on whether either of these professional items is "a fixed and
tangible asset" or perhaps whether it was acquired with family assets
during the marriage.""
If the analysis of Paulsen v. Paulsen' and Bachman v. Bach-
man42 0 were literally applied to a case involving the distribution of a
professional degree, license, or increased earning capacity incident to a
divorce, there is a distinct possibility that a denial of property status
would result. This assessment is grounded primarily upon those attrib-
utes that presently distinguish in Arkansas "a fixed and tangible asset"
from something which is not "a fixed and tangible asset." Namely, it
appears that an Arkansas appellate court might conclude that in no
traditional sense of the word is a professional degree, license, or en-
hanced earning capacity a vested asset, for neither inures solely to the
benefit of its holder and each discontinues upon the holder's death.
416. The absence of any Arkansas court decision on the issue of classifying a professional
degree, license or increased earning capacity is not altogether surprising given the relative dearth
of decisions nationwide. See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294, 1295 (1981).
417. The two principal cases, of course, were once Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601
S.W.2d 873 (1980) (the military pension case) and Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621
S.W.3d 701 (1981) (the first civilian pension benefits case). But the recent case of Day v. Day,
281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), may now be the preeminent case in the pension area.
418. Although it was always possible to surmise that the Arkansas courts might use a mode
of analysis analytically different from that found in Paulsen and Bachman, the seminal pension
cases, some doubt as to the court's willingness to do so was questioned in view of subsequent cases
like Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982), and McMurtray v. McMurtray,
275 Ark. 303, 629 S.W.2d 285 (1982), where the supreme court, in non-pension cases, relentlessly
searched for "a fixed and tangible asset" in reliance on existing precedent. But, because of the
apparent directional change evident in Day, it is more likely that its new approach to marital
property would be the template in a marital property issue involving a professional degree, license,
or increased earning capacity.
419. Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980).
420. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981).
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Moreover, such a degree or license or increased earning capacity has
purely an intangible value and does not accumulate in a traditional
sense; any value which either might have, an Arkansas court might
rule, is intrinsic and hinges upon the intangible qualities of the holder
such as his or her initiative, drive, determination, resourcefulness, and
industry. And finally, unlike the pension benefit in Bachman, a profes-
sional degree, license, or increased earning capacity is not a fixed asset
in the sense of being distributable to the holder in a definitely ascer-
tainable amount at the moment of divorce. To the contrary, the relative
worth or value, present and future, of such items is so speculative and
hinges on so many variables as to defy any characterization other than
"an intangible and amorphous asset," which lacks the essential attrib-
utes of property. 1
Although the aforementioned analysis will apparently lead to the
ineluctable conclusion that a professional degree, license, or increased
earning capacity is not property which is subject to division under the
Arkansas marital property statute4 2 it is conceivable that an Arkansas
appellate court might adopt the more recent reasoning of Day v. Day425
as the basis for departure from the judicial analysis which abounds in
Paulsen, Bachman, and their progeny concerning the definition of prop-
erty. This is not improbable, although the earlier analysis has tran-
scended decisions involving pension plans and has been applied to cases
involving interests in company stock424 and capital accounts42 5 as
well.42' But the supreme court in Day does not clearly limit its "new
concept of 'marital property'" to interests in pension plans, either. In
fact, one may reasonably conclude that "earnings or other property ac-
quired by each spouse" during the marriage through the use of family
assets embrace a professional degree, license, or increased earning ca-
421. It is conceivable that these professional items might also be denominated as future bene-
fits, the value of which "has not been acquired." Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 47, 655 S.W.2d
382, 387 citing Bachman and Paulsen.
422. It is possible, however, that an Arkansas appellate court, congruent with the reasoning
of Paulsen, might hold that a professional degree, license, or increased earning capacity is an
economic factor which may be considered in connection with alimony and child support awards.
423. Supra note 292.
424. McMurtray v. McMurtray, supra note 291.
425. Hackett v. Hackett, supra note 291.
426. Potter seemed to solidify the pre-Day analysis as well, with its approving allusions to
Paulson and Bachman. But see Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. at 499, 569 S.W.2d at 511,
where the supreme court made nothing more than a conclusional ruling that "an unexercised stock
option is marital property." Actually, no doctrinal basis for the court's determination is evident.
Again, there is an affirmation of the calculus used by the chancellor to determine the value of
the stock options and their allocation. Id. at 502-03, 659 S.W.2d at 513.
427. See the ultimate holding in Day v. Day, 281 Ark. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 772.
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pacity, thus making these items marital property.42 8
Of course, a just and equitable solution could be achieved if the
Arkansas appellate courts would adopt a more expansive definition of
property which does embrace professional degrees, licenses, or in-
creased earning capacity.429 The partnership theory would be vindi-
cated by this more liberal approach because the parties to the marriage
would actually be compensated for the benefits that flowed to the mar-
riage as a consequence of their efforts, including those expended in as-
sisting a spouse acquire a professional degree, license, or increased
earning capacity.
Assuming arguendo that a property label will be affixed to these
professional items, the Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court
of Appeals should exercise extreme caution in fashioning an appropri-
ate remedy. The remedy should be property-based and not merely pro-
vide a form of restitution which does not adequately compensate the
working spouse for his or her veritable property expectations in the de-
gree, license, or enhanced future earning capacity.
No one can prognosticate with absolute certainty the ultimate res-
olution of the professional degree, license, or increased earning capacity
issue in Arkansas. At this point, a wager on nonrecognition may be
provident.48 0 And this will simply result in the inequitable perpetuation
of the "putting the hubby through" syndrome.
C. Professional Goodwill
As noted earlier,4 3 1 the issues that surface in regard to the good-
will of a professional practice vis-i-vis equitable distribution of marital
property bear a remarkable resemblance to those discussed previously
in connection with the professional degree, license, or enhanced earning
capacity. Here, too, there is no clear-cut precedent in Arkansas to fol-
low.43 2 Yet, one can reasonably divine that the primary issues for fu-
428. Id. The broadly worded holding in Day, coupled with the court's concession that it was
"not attempting to lay down inflexible rules for the future," creates a reasonable possibility that a
professional degree, license, or increased earning capacity may be declared someday to be marital
property. Id.
429. A broad construction of "property" would not be unprecedented because that is pre-
cisely what has been done in some other cases where there has been a property recognition. See,
Note, supra note 143, at 542.
430. The Day analysis may create a closer question and conceivably a contrary result.
431. See supra notes 183-86.
432. In Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 499, 500, 659 S.W.2d 510, 512 (1983), the
Arkansas Supreme Court may have obliquely shed some light on the issue of professional goodwill
by holding that a spouse's interest in a commercial partnership (a beauty school), which included
commercial goodwill, was marital property. Although this decision was limited ostensibly to com-
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ture judicial determination in Arkansas will be: (1) Whether profes-
sional goodwill is "property" for the purposes of the Arkansas marital
property statute, and, if so, (2) How do you value and then allocate it?
Regarding the property issue, a visceral response might be that
professional goodwill is not divisible property in Arkansas simply be-
cause it is not "a fixed and tangible asset."' 33 That is, this interest
seems to be just as intangible and elusive as a professional degree, li-
cense, or increased earning capacity, if not more. 34 Thus, one might
reasonably surmise that either the Arkansas Supreme Court or the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals, or both, will decide the divisible property
question as regards professional goodwill in the negative.4 5 But the Ar-
kansas appellate courts do have a fair amount of precedent from other
states which, if followed, would be a predicate for deciding that profes-
sional goodwill is indeed divisible property in spite of objective criteria
seemingly to the contrary.3 6 And, here again, the apparent change in
direction with respect to the concept of marital property as manifested
in Day v. Day may very well serve as the impetus for the adoption of
an extensive definition of marital property that indeed envelops profes-
sional goodwill.
In short, it remains open to supposition as to which position the
Arkansas appellate courts will adopt to decide the "property" question
mercial goodwill as a species of marital property, the court's mode of analysis might be susceptible
to a much broader application. For example, in his dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Purtle
stated: "Granting appellee an interest in the partnership is like granting the wife of a lawyer an
interest in his law firm." Id. at 504, 659 S.W.2d at 513.
But the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Gooch v. Gooch, - Ark. Ct. App. -, 664 S.W.2d
900, 903 (1984), faced squarely the issue of whether a husband's law practice was marital prop-
erty under the facts of the case. The court resolved the issue as follows:
We find no error in the trial court's determination that appellant was not entitled to a
portion of appellee's law practice as marital property because of her contributions as a
party hostess. Appellee's practice had been established many years before his marriage
to appellant. No showing was made that her serving as a party hostess in any way
contributed to the growth of appellee's law practice.
The majority opinion in Richardson also provides some insight as to the method of valuing the
partnership interest, basically the technique used by the chancellor. Id. at 500-01, 659 S.W.2d at
512.
433. Again, ascribing non-property status to professional goodwill would be predicated upon
earlier Arkansas Supreme Court pronouncements of what is and what is not divisible property for
the purposes of the general marital property statute. These cases are discussed at supra notes 284-
291.
434. As noted earlier, a goodly number of courts have apparently discounted the elusiveness,
nebulousness, and speculativeness of professional goodwill and have held that it is property. See
supra notes 190-192.
435. This speculation presupposes that Bachman, Paulsen, and their progeny will be the con-
trolling precedents.
436. See supra notes 190-194.
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regarding professional goodwill. If traditional Arkansas judicial analy-
sis is adhered to, there is a distinct possibility that the courts will rule
that professional goodwill is not divisible property upon divorce.4 3
7
However, if the courts deviate from this reasoning, as many other
courts have inexplicably done, it is conceivable that an extremely intan-
gible, amorphous asset will indeed enter the realm of marital property
subject to division at divorce. 3 8 As noted earlier, Day may already re-
present such a deviation from the traditional norm.'8 9
If the Arkansas courts should decide that professional goodwill is
property, the monumental task of valuing this asset will arise. As previ-
ously noted,"' the factors which underlie this determination paint a
picture of uncertainty, volatility, and disorder with respect to placing a
value on goodwill.
D. Treating the Marital Home Held in Tenancy by the Entirety
Unlike many vital issues which still require further clarification by
the Arkansas courts, 44 1 the parameters for the treatment of the marital
home owned as a tenancy by the entirety seem at first blush to have
been fairly well-defined. The Arkansas courts have expressly held, as
previously noted," that property held as a tenancy by the entirety is
not marital property subject to division under the Arkansas marital
property statute." 3 Instead, it is property subject to equal division
under the tenancy by the entirety statute."'
It would be quite palatable to conclude this discussion with the
rulings of Warren v. Warren and its progeny.44 But the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, in Pinkston v. Pinkston," 6 may have muddied the issue
437. By "traditional Arkansas judicial analysis" is meant the reasoning consistently used by
the courts in their inexorable quest for "a fixed and tangible asset." See Hackett v. Hackett, 278
Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982); McMurtray v. McMurtray, 275 Ark. 303, 629 S.W.2d 285
(1982); Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981); Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark.
523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980).
438. Indeed, some commentators have expressed astonishment and consternation at those ju-
dicial decisions which have recognized professional goodwill as a divisible marital asset. See. e.g.,
Scribner, supra note 184 at 327.
439. Supra, notes 436-38.
440. See supra notes at 193-199.
441. See earlier discussion of unsettled questions at supra notes 394-440.
442. See supra notes 335-337.
443. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983).
444. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981).
445. See Wagh v. Wagh, 7 Ark. Ct. App. 122, 644 S.W.2d 278 (1982); Bratcher v. Bratch-
er, 5 Ark. Ct. App. 250, 635 S.W.2d 278 (1982); Askins v. Askins, 5 Ark. Ct. App. 64, 632
S.W.2d 249 (1982).
446. 278 Ark. 233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983).
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by holding that the division of jointly held property (in Pinkston, a
farm) was governed by the general marital property statute and could
be divided unequally if equitable circumstances dictated it. What does
this mean? Does Pinkston detract from the precedent previously estab-
lished by Warren? Are the two cases reconciliable?
Although no absolutely certain response can be made to any of the
aforementioned questions, it is highly probable that the supreme court's
decision in Warren with respect to tenancy by the entirety property
remains completely intact. At no point in Pinkston does the supreme
court even cite Warren, much less explicitly modify or overrule it. But
Pinkston did involve a farm which was "jointly held" by the parties to
the marriage; property which is jointly held by the spouses is normally
owned as tenants by the entirety.447 And, as was stated in Warren,
there must be an equal division of entirety property. To be sure, Pink-
ston casts some doubt over what was initially thought to be crystal
clear in view of Warren. Unfortunately, it may require another court
decision to efface the apparent ambiguity which may now exist.
448 Of
course, reaffirming the rationale of Warren would be the prudent
course of action for the Arkansas courts.
E. Precisely Defining the Contours of the Statutory Exceptions of
the Marital Property Law
To delimit the precise boundaries of the various exceptions to the
Arkansas marital property law449 is, of course, extremely desirable. But
it remains largely undone. The notable exceptions to marital property
which have not been the subject of any judicial construction and which
may be some of the most involved are those excluding (1) "[p]roperty
acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage '450 and
(2) property acquired "in exchange for property acquired by gift, in-
heritance or devise or descent."45 1 As noted earlier,5 2 these provisions
447. Apparently, it does not always follow that property held jointly by the parties is owned
in tenancy by the entirety. See Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 534-35, 623 S.W.2d 813, 817
(1981). Yet, if a survivorship interest is created, such property is still subject to the entirety
statute and not the general marital property division statute. Id.
448. On the other hand, the two decisions may be entirely compatible if, for example, the
supreme court used the term "jointly held property" in Pinkston to simply mean property ac-
quired during the marriage (marital property) but not as a tenancy by the entirety nor with right
of survivorship.
449. The exceptions to Arkansas' marital property law are codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-1214(B)(l)-(5) (Supp. 1983).
450. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(2) (Supp. 1983).
451. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(2) (Supp. 1983).
452. See supra note 347.
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of the Arkansas marital property law have unfortunately escaped judi-
cial perusal.4 53
In both of these statutory exceptions, complex questions may inva-
riably arise whenever the property acquired prior to marriage or that
acquired by gift, inheritance, devise, or descent is exchanged for other
property after having been the recipient of some improvements by the
non-owner spouse4 " or having been commingled for some period of
time with property of the non-owner spouse.
When improvements have been made by the non-owner spouse
which actually preserve or enhance the value of the premarital, inher-
ited, or gift property prior to its exchange, the Arkansas courts will
probably defer to the Callaway v. Callaway455 reasoning and hold that
the non-owner spouse is simply entitled to compensation up to one-half
of the value of the improvements actually made, if this is equitable, but
that the property which is acquired in exchange for the premarital, in-
herited, or gift property is still not marital property under the Arkansas
marital property statute.4 6
Whenever premarital, inherited, or gift property is commingled
with property in which the other spouse has some interest, the Arkan-
sas courts, congruent with other decisions, 457 will probably focus upon
whether the combining of a spouse's exempt property with property (ei-
ther marital or separate) of the other spouse manifests some kind of
donative intent on the part of the spouse with respect to the exempt
property. If a gift were found, then the premarital, inherited, or gift
property would become the jointly held property of the spouses and
property obtained subsequently in exchange for it should perforce be
marital property, too.45 8 Judging from past decisions, the Arkansas
453. Perhaps this total lack of judicial scrutiny can be explained in terms of the relatively
short period of time for these issues to work their way to the Arkansas appellate courts since the
effective date of the marital property statute in 1979.
454. As previously noted, there has been an improvements case, Callaway v. Callaway, 8
Ark. Ct. App. 129, 134, 648 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1983), where the Arkansas Court of Appeals
reasoned that in regard to real property acquired before marriage it was possible for a spouse who
in fact made some improvements to the property to recover up to one-half of the value of those
improvements, particularly if marital property were used in making them.
455. Id.
456. In other words, the newly acquired property should still fall within an exception to the
marital property rule.
457. See supra notes 349-356.
458. There may be some question as to whether such property would be divisible under the
general marital property statute (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214) or under the entirety statute
(ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1215). See Perrin v. Perrin, 9 Ark. Ct. App. 170, 175-76, 656 S.W.2d
245, 248 (1983), where a gift created a tenancy by the entirety interest in shares of stock and a
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courts are likely to be disinclined to find the existence of a gift unless
extremely convincing evidence of donative intent is available.4 59 And
there is no apparent reason now to believe that any less rigid stance
will be adopted in the future.
Another statutory exception to marital property which has ostensi-
bly escaped judicial interpretation concerns "[t]he increase in value of
property acquired prior to the marriage."460 However, the Arkansas
Supreme Court may have tangentially addressed this question while
dealing with the issue of the provision of improvements in Callaway v.
Callaway,461 a case which was discussed earlier.46 It is evident, how-
ever, that the "improvements" question is not completely coextensive
with the "increase in value" exception to the marital property law. But
to the extent that some improvements do actually enhance the value of
property acquired prior to marriage, the "improvements" and the "in-
crease in value" determinations may clash in terms of their operative
effect.
For example, A and B are married. At the time of their marriage,
A already owns a house. B, a crackerjack carpenter, later makes some
substantial improvements to the house which significantly increase its
value. Unfortunately, all is not perpetual bliss for this couple, and B
eventually sues A for divorce. Query: how does the court allocate the
improvements made to the house? If the issue is resolved pursuant to
the Callaway rationale, there is a distinct possibility that the court will
equally divide the value of the improvements between the parties. But
if the improvements are examined from the standpoint of increasing the
value of the property, then this may implicate the "increase in value"
exception to the marital property law. And this increase in value would
normally be outside the realm of marital property and thus would not
be divisible between the parties. Of course, this may be one of those
exceptional situations6 8 where a court can affect a distribution of sepa-
rate property in view of the enumerated equitable distribution criteria
in the statute.'"
parcel of land, making the property divisible under the entirety statute.
459. See supra notes 349-356. See also Perrin v. Perrin, 9 Ark. Ct. App. 170, 656 S.W.2d
245 (1983).
460. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(5) (Supp. 1983).
461. 8 Ark. Ct. App. 129, 648 S.W.2d 520 (1983).
462. See supra notes 388-393.
463. To this writer's knowledge, such a situation has yet to arise before the Arkansas courts,
although it has been alluded to in dicta. See, e.g., Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d
398 (1983) and Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W.2d 382 (1983).
464. Id. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Supp. 1983).
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Further judicial guidance is obviously desirable in this area. More-
over, there is an even greater need for court decisions which clearly
define the exact parameters of the "increase in value" exception to
marital property in a variety of disparate factual situations. Hopefully,
an increased level of judicial activity in this regard is forthcoming.
Regarding the "[p]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the
parties" exception under the Arkansas marital property law,"15 it is en-
couraging that the Arkansas Court of Appeals has rendered some in-
structive decisions with respect to the validity of reconciliation agree-
ments as an exclusion to marital property.46 Beyond this, however,
there is an absolute void with respect to illumination concerning the
potential validity of other agreements under this exception.
As noted earlier,"7 postnuptial agreements, which are fair and
reasonable, should be an acceptable means of escaping the rubric of
marital property." Although some definitive guidance from the appel-
late courts would be helpful, there are no apparent exigent circum-
stances currently engulfing the postnuptial agreement question.469 To
the contrary, there is reason for consternation as regards the question
of whether and under what circumstances antenuptial agreements are
valid methods of excluding property acquired during marriage from the
ambit of marital property. The Arkansas marital property statute does
not explicitly define "valid agreement." Even in the absence of an ex-
pansive judicial definition of the term, it can be fairly assumed that
reasonable, fair antenuptial agreements implicate the "valid agree-
ment" exception under the statute. However, this reasoning may be fal-
lacious in view of the Arkansas antenuptial agreement statute.4 70 Be-
cause the antenuptial agreement statute is not a model of clarity as to
this question, 7 1 it fosters some misgivings as to the efficacy of an ante-
nuptial agreement in excluding what ordinarily would be a marital as-
465. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(4) (Supp. 1983).
466. See Smith v. Smith, 6 Ark. Ct. App. 252, 640 S.W.2d 458 (1982) and Schichtel v.
Schichtel, 3 Ark. Ct. App. 36, 38-39, 621 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1981).
467. See supra notes 358-366.
468. See DuCanto, supra note 87 and the UMDA § 306 (property agreements are valid and
binding upon the court if not unconscionable).
469. Perhaps there is less concern with respect to post-nuptial agreements because there is a
virtual consensus about the elements of such a valid agreement. See, e.g., Id. ("fair and
reasonable").
470. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-309-314 (Supp. 1983).
471. Quite honestly, anyone who is skillful in legislative drafting might readily disavow any
responsibility for the Arkansas antenupial agreement statute. See, e.g., the remarks of Phillip E.
Dixon, Esq., which were delivered at the Arkansas Bar Association Fall Legal Institute (1982).
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set from the category of marital property. 73 But a cogent argument
can probably be adduced to support the effectiveness of an antenuptial
agreement in excluding property from the category of marital property
if it simply meets the basic validity requirements outlined in the ante-
nuptial agreement statute: (1) there must be "a full and fair disclos-
ure" by the parties of their respective financial resources and (2) both
parties must be afforded the "opportunity to consult" with a lawyer "of
their own choice.' 478 Nevertheless, some ambiguity, perhaps an intoler-
able amount, does exist; until the Arkansas courts act to rectify the
problem, uncertainty will persist.' 7 '
The final exception to the Arkansas marital property law to be
discussed-" [p] roperty acquired by a spouse after a decree of divorce
from bed and board' 47 5 -suffers from the same defect as many others:
there is scant judicial interpretation of it.47' But one can reasonably
assume that if there were a legitimate decree of divorce from bed and
board already in existence at the time property is acquired by either
party to the marriage, then this property would not be marital
property.' 7
7
472. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-309 (Supp. 1983) engenders the greatest uncertainty. In its
pertinent provisions, the statute provides:
...An antenuptial contract or settlement made in conformity with this section may
determine what rights each party has in the non-marital property, being all property
other than "marital property" as defined in Ark. Stat. 34-1214(B). . .This act [§§ 55-
309-55-314] shall not be construed to make invalid or unenforceable any antenuptial
agreement or settlement made and executed in conformity with this act because the
agreement or settlement covers or includes marital property, if the agreement or settle-
ment would be valid and enforceable without regard to this act.
473. Id.
Regarding an antenuptial agreement entered into prior to the effective date of the Arkansas
antenuptial agreement statute, it "is valid if it was freely entered into, and is free from fraud and
not inequitable." Gooch v. Gooch, - Ark. Ct. App. _ 664 S.W.2d 900, 902 (1984).
474. Corrective measures also may fall within the bailiwick of the Arkansas Legislature.
475. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(3) (Supp. 1983).
476. The Arkansas Court of Appeals mentioned glancingly this exception in Schichtel v.
Schichtel, 3 Ark. Ct. App. 36, 41, 621 S.W.2d 504, 508 (1981). The court rejected the contention
that it applied to the facts of Schichtel by summarily stating "that Arkansas law authorizes di-
vorce from bed and board but not legal separation." Id. At the time the complaint was apparently
filed, the statute read "legal separation." Subsequently, the words "divorce from bed and board"
were substituted by the legislature. See 1981 Ark. Acts 799.
477. Of course, the Arkansas marital property statute applies to a divorce from bed and
board as well as an absolute divorce. See Forrest v. Forrest, 279 Ark. 115, 116, 649 S.W.2d 173,
174 (1983).
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VII. AD HOC JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CAN THE
ARKANSAS LEGISLATURE FILL THE VOID?
At this point, it is painfully apparent that, after five years have
passed since the seminal enactment of the Arkansas marital property
law,478 a number of significant questions concerning marital property
division in Arkansas still remain unresolved.47 9 In large measure, this
inertia is probably attributable to the inherent nature of our judicial
system which is often extremely cumbersome; this has been exacer-
bated by the apparent desire of the Arkansas appellate
courts-particularly the Arkansas Supreme Court-to move very
slowly and methodically in resolving marital property issues on a case-
by-case basis.480 The obvious drawback to such an approach is that a
lawyer may be forestalled from giving complete and accurate advice to
his or her clients concerning their marital property rights upon di-
vorce.4 81 Consequently, a client may be forced to pursue very costly
litigation to get an ad hoc definitive ruling from the Arkansas appellate
courts.48
In view of these inherent limitations in the judicial decision mak-
ing process, attention must perforce be directed to the Arkansas legisla-
tive arena. Quite frankly, upon close examination, the Arkansas Gen-
eral Assembly has amassed a fairly admirable record in connection
with marital property division. Beginning with the initial statutory en-
actment in 1979,488 the General Assembly has made changes in the
478. See supra notes 74-98 for an in-depth discussion of the Arkansas marital property
statute.
479. For example, only some of the most elementary questions have been addressed regard-
ing pensions. And no decisions, to date, have focused upon troublesome topics such as the treat-
ment of a professional degree, license, increased future earning capacity, or goodwill. Moreover,
the scope of many of the exceptions to marital property remain undefined.
480. A graphic illustration of the undesirability of this ad hoc approach is Bachman v. Bach-
man, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981), where the supreme court made a very narrow determi-
nation and, in the process, perhaps left a number of vital questions unanswered with respect to
civilian pensions.
Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 268, 633 S.W.2d 719, 722 (1984) is perhaps an exception to this
discernible ad hoc approach because of its expansive language. Yet, even in this instance, there is
an apparent attempt-perhaps in vain-to limit the scope of the court's holding.
481. Regarding the undecided questions, a lawyer's response will invariably be uncertain if
the Arkansas appellate courts have yet to address the issue. There is not much solace in such a
situation for either the attorney or the client.
482. The inclination of Arkansas appellate courts to decide only those questions essential to
the resolution of the particular case before them is well established. (See. e.g., McNew v. McNew,
262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977).) Nevertheless, this practice may foster judicial inefficiency
which frequently operates to the disadvantage of those parties not before the court with issues
generically related to, but dissimilar from, the issue that the court is actually deciding.
483. As noted earlier, the Arkansas legislature enacted the first Arkansas marital property
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marital property law at each ensuing regular legislative session."84 And,
most importantly, these modifications were made to rectify problems
that had surfaced in the day-to-day application of the statute. For ex-
ample, the legislature eliminated the requirement that the chancellor
state his reasons in writing for making an unequal division of marital
property; 85 it added a provision listing federal income tax conse-
quences as an equitable distribution criterion;486 it deleted the term "le-
gal separation" and substituted in place the phrase "divorce from bed
and board;4187 and most recently, it added specific provisions governing
the disposition of marital property which is in the form of stocks,
bonds, and securities.4 88 In seemingly every instance, the legislature has
responded with a felicitous solution for the particular problem.
Query: Can the Arkansas legislature compensate for some of the
sluggishness in the judicial process by providing a legislative answer to
many of the questions still surrounding the Arkansas marital property
statute? For example, it seems quite reasonable that the legislature
could specifically address the intricate, unanswered questions surround-
ing pensions (i.e., valuation and distribution, etc.). It could also specifi-
cally define the status of a professional degree, license, or increased
earning capacity under the Arkansas marital property statute. 89 More-
division statute in response to appeals for a new property division law because of suspected consti-
tutional infirmities in the predecessor legislation. See supra notes 71-73.
484. Since 1979, there have been two regular sessions, one in 1981 and another in 1983. A
special legislative session in 1983 did not produce any new marital property legislation.
485. The major impetus for this modification was that the "in writing" requirement had
become so time-consuming for chancellors that it impeded their ability to expeditiously process the
cases much to the dismay of the parties. See the emergency (statement of purpose) clause to 1981
Ark. Acts 69, and the legislative declaration contained therein.
486. The federal income tax consequences criterion was added in recognition of the fact that
federal income tax obligations arising from a property division incident to divorce can genuinely
affect the real value of what is received by either party upon the distribution of the marital prop-
erty. See statement of purpose clause for 1981 Ark. Acts 798.
487. This change was necessitated by the discovery that there was no statutory authority for
a legal separation in Arkansas; but there clearly is statutory authority for divorce from bed and
board. See, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1983); Schichtel v. Schichtel, 3 Ark. Ct. App. 36,
41, 621 S.W.2d 504, 508 (1981). ("...Arkansas law authorizes divorce from bed and board but
not legal separation.")
488. 1983 Ark. Acts 369. Now codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-1214(A)(4) (Supp. 1983).
This amendment was designed to rectify problems that had developed in regard to effecting a 50-
50 division of marital property in the form of stocks, bonds, and securities.
489. For example, North Carolina has a statutory provision concerning "professional licenses
and business licenses." Those that "terminate or transfer shall be considered separate property."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Supp. 1981). But see Comment, The Career Asset as 'New
Property' Subject to Distribution Upon Marriage Dissolution, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 489 (1983),
(theorizes that the time has come for state legislatures to treat professional licenses, degrees, and
increased earning capacity as divisible property). Moreover, the treatment of pension benefits has
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over, the legislature might provide more insight as to its intent with
regard to the federal income tax consequences of a marital property
division in Arkansas.490
If both the Arkansas legislature and the Arkansas courts would
assume a more activist role in filling the gaps that currently exist in
Arkansas marital property law, then the unanswered and partially an-
swered problems would probably be resolved through this miraculous
process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is quite evident that an unacceptably large number of vital is-
sues concerning marital property division-both in the nation as a
whole and particularly in Arkansas-remain shrouded in uncertainty.
This is intolerable because the informed treatment of pension benefits,
professional degrees and licenses, professional goodwill, and the like,
under the Arkansas marital property statute is of paramount impor-
tance to those Arkansans whose marital property rights are subject to
judicial determination in divorce proceedings.
The answer to this unpalatable situation lies in large measure with
both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
been legislatively addressed by some states. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 20-107.3(E)(8)(1983), where
"(t)he present value of pension or retirement benefits, whether vested or non-vested," is listed as
an equitable distribution criterion; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Supp. 1981) ("Vested pension
or retirement benefits and the expectation of nonvested pension or retirement rights shall be con-
sidered separate property"); and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(5) (West Supp. 1983) ("'Marital
property' means property, real or personal, including vested pension benefits or rights, acquired by
the parties or either of them. . .at any time during the existence of the marriage relation
between. .. ")
490. In a similar vein, see Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 499, 501, 659 S.W.2d 510,
512, (1983) where a chancellor's consideration of the income tax consequences of a property divi-
sion to make an equitable apportionment of a party's "interest in the Murphy Oil thrift plan" was
affirmed by the supreme court.
But in Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 268, 663 S.W.2d 719, 722, the Arkansas Supreme Court
rejected the contention that it would be unfair to the husband, in view "of possible tax conse-
quences," to classify "his equity in the retirement plan as marital property." Explaining the rea-
sons underlying its position, the court stated:
This matter was not developed at the trial, nor could it have been, for the tax conse-
quences depend upon what federal and state tax laws may be in force as much as ten or
twenty years from now. The parties, however, should share the tax burden equitably.
We therefore amend the decree to reserve jurisdiction in the trial court for the resolu-
tion of any tax problem that may arise.
And in Bagwell v. Bagwell, supra note 395, the supreme court, expressing some concern that
tax consequences might make the particular property division inequitable at some future time,
adopted the same course of action utilized in Day: it "modified the decree to reserve jurisdiction in
the trial court to make such adjustments as the final tax consequences indicated." Id.
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An aggressive judicial decision making policy addressing marital prop-
erty issues with a broad brush should be adopted to replace the re-
strained, piecemeal approach which has been so evident since the Ar-
kansas marital property division statute was enacted in 1979 .49 Such
an approach by the appellate courts would undoubtedly hasten the de-
finitive resolution of most, if not all, of the unanswered and partially
answered marital property questions which currently abound. And this
would clearly be in the best interest of the thousands of divorce liti-
gants in Arkansas.
Although one could legitimately look to the Arkansas General As-
sembly once again to respond to some or all of the knotty questions
concerning marital property division in Arkansas, it is equally desira-
ble, if not more so, that the Arkansas appellate courts begin to move
more decisively and swiftly in this area and stop tiptoeing together
through the tulips with the Arkansas marital property statute.
491. Day v. Day represents Arkansas' boldest judicial initiative to date in the area of marital
property rights. Yet, it quite possibly may be restricted to interests in pension plans. And this
implicates only a small fraction of the questions surrounding the distribution of marital property
upon divorce in Arkansas.
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